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data underlies the study at hand.
I would like to thank RFF for the ﬁnancial support making this study possible. I am
grateful to Helene for all guidance with respect to this study and for the close cooperation
we have had. I would like to thank Maria for the indispensable support and cooperation
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organisation, for the cooperation and help, and in particular Catherine Maguzu, Deputy
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Despite the fact that obesity is considered to be a global epidemic by the World Health
Organisation, three out of ten people in low income countries still suﬀers from undernour-
ishment.1 Technological changes within the agricultural sector have the scope of ensuring
the food security of subsistence farmers in developing countries, but the process of techno-
logical change is complex. The diﬀusion of new technologies is often slower than classical
economic theory would predict, because farmers do not have perfect information about
the new agricultural techniques and the relative proﬁtability of a new technology may
depend on local circumstances. The decision to adopt a new technology is aﬀected by
the farmer's uncertainty about its relative advantage, and when information ﬂows from
government and research institutions are limited or not trust-worthy, farmers will rely on
information from neighbours and friends about new technologies.
Through information networks of the farmers, development projects with the aim of
closing the technological gap may be able to increase their reach beyond the initial project
participants. I study this hypothesis empirically using household data from northern
rural Tanzania. A new banana cultivation technique was introduced by an agricultural
project, RIPAT,2 in 2006, which aimed at increasing the food security in the project area.
I study farmers who did not initially sign up for the project and investigate to what
extent discussing farming issues with participating farmers aﬀects the decision to adopt
improved banana cultivation. My research question is: How does adoption of improved
banana cultivation among non-project participants depend on information links to the
initial participating farmers?
To my knowledge, there exist no prior studies of such second generation project take-
up in the literature of adoption of agricultural technologies. From a policy perspective,
it is relevant to study the second generation take-up of a programme because continued
diﬀusion of the introduced technology will increase the impact of the project. Under-
1The World Health Organisation states that obesity is a global epidemic here:
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/obesity/en/. In 2008, 29 percent of the population in
low income countries were undernourished according to the World Development Indicators:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
2RIPAT stands for the Rockwool Initiative for Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania.
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standing the social learning processes in the dissemination of knowledge will have policy
implications for eﬃcient targeting of future project participants.
Within development economics, social learning has received increased attention over
the past two decades. The theoretical literature on the subject grew rapidly in the 1990s
(Banerjee, 1992; Besley and Case, 1993; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993; Foster and Rosen-
zweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999), whereas the empirical literature has followed more
slowly in the later years (Munshi, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry,
2010). Munshi (2007) assigns these diﬀerential trends to the diﬃculty of identifying so-
cial learning eﬀects. This paper will add to the thin empirical literature and identiﬁcation
will play a central role throughout the paper, guided by the pioneer study of identiﬁcation
of social interactions by Manski (1993).
The empirical analysis in this paper shows that farmers who discuss farming issues with
banana growing project participants are more likely to adopt improved banana cultivation.
Meanwhile there is also tentative evidence of an impact of discussing farming issues with
banana growers who are not project participants, though this eﬀect is substantially lower
and less robust. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the important role of information networks for
the adoption decision as suggested by the main part of the theoretical literature and as
found in the few other sound empirical studies. But in addition, this paper contributes to
the literature by providing a policy suggestion for future agricultural projects focused on
knowledge transfer: the results suggest that targeting well-connected farmers will increase
the impact of the project through diﬀusion of technology in the local communities.
The data underlying this analysis were collecting in January 2011 for the purpose of
an impact evaluation of the RIPAT project and for this study of diﬀusion of technology.
The analysis is based on farmers who live in villages where the RIPAT project took
place but who did not sign up for the project. Hence, I employ a subset of these data
comprising of 520 households in eight rural villages in Arumeru district, Tanzania. My
measure of the information network of the farmer has three components: The network
size, the number of network members who grow improved bananas and among these, the
RIPAT farmers in the network for whom I have detailed background information. All
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three network variables are captured with recall questions referring to the time before
the decision to adopt was taken. Logit estimates show that for a given network size, the
number of banana growers and in particular RIPAT banana growers in the network has a
strong and signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the propensity to adopt.3
The identiﬁcation strategy relies on three falsiﬁcation tests related to reverse causality
and two diﬀerent types of confounding eﬀects that cause a positive correlation between
adoption and the number of adopters in network. As a start, I consider the concern
of reverse causality : despite the fact that networks are captured by recall questions, a
farmer's ex ante perception of the proﬁtability of banana cultivation may aﬀect network
formation before adoption. I exploit the presence of super farmers in the project (farmers
who are trained to teach banana cultivation to peers), who would naturally be the ones
to contact if a farmer is interested in banana cultivation. If they are better represented
in the network of non-participating farmers than regular RIPAT farmers are, that could
indicate that the network measure is endogenous. I show that super farmers are not
more likely to occur in the network of a non-participating farmer than a regular RIPAT
farmer is, which indicates that my network measure is not endogenous to the adoption
decision. To proceed, I employ the useful distinction of Manski (1993) between endoge-
nous social interaction eﬀects, contextual eﬀects and correlated eﬀects. First, I address
contextual eﬀects which are deﬁned as the impact of the characteristics of the network on
the individual adoption decision. They are also considered as social interaction eﬀects,
but (Manski, 1993, p.:532) term them exogenous because they relate to the eﬀect of the
characteristics of network members, such as education and wealth, rather than the impact
of network adoption behaviour. As I only have elaborate data on the RIPAT farmers in
the network I address contextual eﬀects by splitting the RIPAT farmers in the network
according to socioeconomic characteristics to investigate if the network eﬀect is heteroge-
neous across characteristics of network members. I do not ﬁnd support for heterogeneous
eﬀects which indicates that network eﬀects are not driven by contextual eﬀects. Second,
correlated eﬀects represent factors that induce a correlation in behaviour within networks
3I consider improved banana cultivation, but for simplicity I disregard the word improved. I will
always state explicitly if I refer to traditional banana cultivation.
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which is not due to social interaction, such as a common environment or common indi-
vidual speciﬁc characteristics. To address correlation due to environment, I control for
growing conditions and subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects. To investigate the likely correlation of
unobserved individual characteristics within networks, I perform a placebo study where
I exchange adoption of banana cultivation with the adoption of diﬀerent cash crops as
the outcome variables. If for instance the number of RIPAT banana growers in network
captures entrepreneurial spirit, it should also be correlated with the adoption of other
lucrative cash crops. But since I ﬁnd that the number of RIPAT banana growers in the
network does not explain much of the variation in the adoption of other crops, the re-
sults indicate that the strong correlation between adoption of banana cultivation and the
number of banana growing RIPAT farmers in network is not fully driven by correlation
in unobservables.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the existing
literature, followed by an introduction to the context of this paper in section 3. I proceed
to outline the empirical strategy including a description of the data and the applied
methods in section 4, and subsequently, I provide a thorough discussion of identiﬁcation
issues in section 5. Results and several robustness checks are presented in section 6, while
results from the placebo study are shown in section 7. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Literature
The study of adoption of new agricultural technologies is not new in the economics lit-
erature and has been studied in a variety of countries and settings since the seminal
work by Griliches (1957) studying the adoption of hybrid corn in the United States. The
literature is vast as indicated by the review studies Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985)
and Evenson and Westphal (1995), and the more recent handbook chapter of Sunding
and Zilberman (2001). Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) provide the latest review of micro
studies of adoption of technology with a speciﬁc focus on social learning in adoption.
A thorough literature review of the economic research on adoption of technologies is
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beyond the scope of this paper, but I will provide a short overview of the determinants of
adoption of a new technology drawing on both sociological and economic literature. This
overview will guide the choice of explanatory variables in the econometric analysis. Next,
I will mention some key papers from the literature on social interactions and network
with a particular focus on identiﬁcation of social interaction eﬀects, which will provide a
background for discussions of identiﬁcation in section 5. Then I will focus more narrowly
on the literature on adoption of technologies and information networks, ﬁrst with a focus
on theoretical models and ﬁnally with a review of the limited empirical literature within
this ﬁeld. As I do not develop a theoretic model for social learning in this paper, I will
synthesise the implications of the existing models. The empirical studies will serve as a
reference point for econometric analysis.
2.1 Determinants of adoption of a new technology
At ﬁrst, it is good to have a concept of when an agricultural technology is new. It matters
little whether the technology is actually newly developed; what is important according to
Rogers (1995) is whether it is perceived as new by the individual or the local community
where it is introduced.
There can be diﬀerent and several reasons to adopt a new technology. As listed
by Sunding and Zilberman (2001, p.:210) the new technology can be yield-increasing,
cost-reducing, quality-enhancing, risk-reducing, environmental-protection increasing, and
shelf-life enhancing or have several of these qualities, and for modelling purposes it is
important to distinguish. In the sociological literature, Rogers (1995, pp.:17-18) provides
a useful characterisation of innovations that aﬀect the adoption decision. Here, the indi-
vidual choice to adopt depends on the perceived relative advantage of the technology over
existing technologies. The advantage can be economic, but also related to social prestige,
convenience and satisfaction, and the perception is naturally aﬀected by discussion with
peers. Obviously, the economic advantage is the main focus in the economics literature on
the subject (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). A second factor is the compatibility of
the innovation with values, norms and past experiences. Third, the complexity represents
5
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the perception of how diﬃcult the innovation is to understand and use. Fourth, the pos-
sibility of experimenting on a small scale, the trialability, will ease barriers to adoption
and ﬁnally, the observability of the innovation, how visible it is to others, will stimulate
discussion about the innovation and a transfer of information about it.
Within the economic literature, the attention is usually brought to the constraints to
adoption of technology that serves to explain the empirically observed rather slow dif-
fusion process relative to theoretical predictions with unconstrained, fully informed and
rational agents. Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985, p.:255) mention a long list: lack of
credit, limited access to information, aversion to risk, inadequate farm size, inadequate
incentives associated with farm tenure arrangements, insuﬃcient human capital, absence
of equipment to relieve labor shortages [...] chaotic supply of complementary inputs [...]
and inappropriate transportation infrastructure. These factors can explain the lack of
diﬀusion of a new technology which is thought to be advantageous. Evenson and West-
phal (1995) also provide the useful notions of tacitness and circumstantial sensitivity. The
knowledge about how to eﬃciently apply a new technology is to some degree tacit, in the
sense that it is not embodied in machinery and cannot be codiﬁed, which hampers the
transfer of new technologies even under the similar circumstances. When circumstances
diﬀer, the optimal techniques may diﬀer too, leaving room for adjustment of a new tech-
nology to local circumstances. Both concepts leave scope for learning-by-doing and social
learning as they hamper one-size-ﬁts-all information about a new technology.
2.2 Social interactions and networks
Social learning generally plays the role of relaxing an information constraint. The informa-
tion network aﬀects the farmer's perception of the relative advantage of a new technology,
along with the perceived complexity. The possibility to try the new technology on a small
scale fosters learning-by-doing, while visible yields of the new technology stimulates dis-
cussion and exchange of ideas within the information network. Risk averse farmers can be
reluctant to try new unknown technologies, but the uncertainty can be mitigated through
social learning. To the extent that farmers are aware of the growing circumstances of the
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members of their information network, they can add more weight to information from
farmers in their network with similar growing conditions. In these ways, the information
network of the farmer can play an important role for the decision to adopt a new technol-
ogy. Understanding social learning in the context of a project-introduced new agricultural
technology can be important for the future design of development projects.
Among sociologists, social psychologists and anthropologists, social interactions have
long been at the centre of the analysis and a review of this literature is way beyond
the scope of this paper. Within economics, social learning in developing countries has
received increased attention over the past two decades and according to Munshi (2007),
the theoretical literature has grown more rapidly than the empirical literature because of
the diﬃculty of identifying social learning eﬀects. This paper will hence add to the thin
empirical literature placing identiﬁcation at the centre of the analysis.
Studies of identiﬁcation of social interactions constitute a branch of literature per se
(e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2007; Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009; Manski,
2000, forthcoming) spawned by the pioneer study of Manski (1993). He addresses the
identiﬁcation of endogenous social eﬀects which he deﬁnes as the impact of one agent's
actions on another agent's actions. In Manski (2000), he describes three diﬀerent channels
through which the endogenous social eﬀects can work: constraints, preferences and expec-
tations. An example of social interactions through constraints is the case of congestion
where an agent's use of a road constrains other agents' use of the road. Preference interac-
tions are related to e.g. conformism, where the preferences of a group of agents can aﬀect
the preferences of the individual because he wants to be like the others. Finally, agents
can aﬀect each others expectations, e.g. expectations about the unknown proﬁtability
of a new technology. I will focus on the latter type of social interactions in this paper.
Manski (1993) introduces the reﬂection problem that occurs, when a researcher observes
the behaviour in a group and tries to infer the eﬀect of the average group behaviour on
the individual group members. In a linear model it is diﬃcult to distinguish whether the
average group behaviour aﬀects the behaviour of the individual (the endogenous social ef-
fect that we are after) or whether group behaviour is simply the aggregation of individual
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behaviours.
Manski employs the useful vocabulary of endogenous social interaction eﬀects, con-
textual eﬀects and correlated eﬀects. The endogenous eﬀects describe how the behaviour
of the individual is aﬀected by the average behaviour in the peer group. The contextual
eﬀects (or exogenous social eﬀects) cover how the behaviour of the individual is aﬀected
by the exogenous characteristics of the group. The correlated eﬀects are covariation in
behaviour within a group due to similar unobserved individual characteristics or because
group members face a similar environment. I will use this terminology to structure my
identiﬁcation strategy as described in section 5. Where Manski (1993) focuses on identi-
ﬁcation in a linear model, Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider identiﬁcation in the case of
a binary outcome, such as adoption of technology. They both treat social interactions as
relations within a deﬁned group where everyone in the group relate to each other and are
aﬀected by the expected mean behaviour in the group. Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
(2009) add to this literature by considering social networks rather than self-referential
groups. The social networks imply that two persons who are connected to a third person
are not necessarily connected to each other. He exploits this fact to establish identiﬁcation
in a linear model.
One way to obtain a plausible identiﬁcation strategy is to have experimental variation
in the network variables of interest. Kremer and Miguel (2007) study social learning and
deworming behaviour in Kenya and exploit that schools were randomly chosen for the
deworming project. When surveying the social links of parents they hence obtain exoge-
nous variation in the number of links to treated schools conditional on the total number
of links. Similarly, Duﬂo and Saez (2002) use experimental data to identify social interac-
tions in retirement plan decisions at a large American university. Unfortunately, project
participation is not randomly allocated in my study, which complicates the identiﬁcation
of social network eﬀects. I treat the issue rigorously in section 5.
In the following, I will focus more narrowly on articles on information networks and
adoption of technology. Though several articles provide both theoretical and empirical
contributions to the literature I will distinguish between the theoretical models and the
8
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empirical evidence.
2.3 Modelling information networks and adoption
In a world of perfect information there is no room for social learning as all farmers would
know the expected relative yield and the associated risk of a new technology. Subject to
other constraints such as credit and input constraints, all farmers would apply the optimal
technologies the moment they became accessible. However, when information about new
technologies is imperfect, the adoption rate in the farmer's network and hence access to
information about the new technology could potentially aﬀect the adoption decision of
the farmer.
Bayesian models dominate the theoretical literature on information networks and
adoption (e.g. Banerjee, 1992; Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Mun-
shi, 2004) with O'Mara (1971) being among the ﬁrst4 to employ a scientiﬁc Bayesian
model where farmers update their beliefs about the pay-oﬀ of the new crop variety from
period to period through the experience with the crop in the surrounding community.
The target input model is an example of a Bayesian model that incorporates both
learning by doing (Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1994) but also learning from others in the
modiﬁed versions of Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Bardhan and Udry (1999). The
form of the new technology is known by the agents in the model, but the optimal amount
of input is unknown and stochastic and hence, subject to learning. So the agents know
the functional relationship between input and output, but they do not know the mean
target input which optimises the yield of the crop. Applied levels of input above or below
the target input will result in suboptimal yields, and the new technology is assumed to be
superior to existing technologies given that the target input is applied. This implies that
proﬁtability of the new technology grows over time as farmers learn about the target input
either from own experimentation or experimentation in her/his network. Thus, individual
adoption will depend on the adoption rate in the information network of the individual.
However, learning from others also leaves room for strategic delay in adoption as early
4According to Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985, p.:264).
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adopters may forego proﬁts in the learning phase compared to traditional technologies
while late adopters can free-ride on the experimentation of the early adopters, as pointed
out by Bardhan and Udry (1999).
Where uncertainty about optimal input creates scope for learning in the target input
model, other Bayesian models focus on uncertainty of the expected yield or relative prof-
itability of the new technology (Munshi, 2004; Besley and Case, 1993; Banerjee, 1992).
In Besley and Case (1993), the planting decision depends on the expected future gains of
the new technology relative to the traditional technology, and knowledge is a public good,
so farmers update their beliefs about the proﬁtability of the technology either through
experimentation on their own farm or among other farmers in the village. Proﬁtability
is stochastic but not improving over time due to learning as in the target input model.
That is, learning improves the knowledge about the proﬁtability of the new technology,
not the proﬁtability itself. This is also the case in the model of Munshi (2004). He models
the acreage allocated to the new technology instead of the binary decision to adopt or
not. The new technology is more proﬁtable but also more risky and since the farmers
are risk averse they may choose to allocate only part of their land to the new technology.
For maximising expected utility, he applies the mean-standard deviation approach where
the mean yield of the new technology is subject to learning which in turn reduces the un-
certainty and hence the standard deviation of the expected utility. Learning takes place
through observing acreage decisions and yields of other farmers in the village.
An early model within this strain of literature was that of Banerjee (1992). He models
herd behaviour by letting the rational decision maker follow what previous decision makers
had done in her place assuming that they had some important information. This leads
to an ineﬃcient equilibrium which is very volatile to the information received by the ﬁrst
decision maker. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) suggest a model where the decision makers
base their choices on rules of thumb instead of full Bayesian learning, and show that
this model can actually lead to a fairly eﬃcient long-run state in a number of cases even
though the individual decision rules are quite naive.
Taken together, the theoretical models generally predict that individual adoption is
10
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positively aﬀected by adoption in the information network. This is what I want to test
empirically. An exemption is the eﬀect of strategic delay in the target input model which
would imply an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of adopters in the
network and the adoption decision. I will also investigate if this is case in my data. But
ﬁrst I will walk through previous empirical ﬁndings.
2.4 Empirical literature on adoption and networks
As previously mentioned, the empirical literature on adoption of agricultural technologies
and information networks is rather thin, presumably due to the inherent diﬃculties in
identifying social network eﬀects. In order for the researcher to know the relevant ref-
erence group, data on individual self-reported networks may be needed which increases
data requirements for studies of social networks. Durlauf and Ioannides (2010, p.:470)
distinguish between social interactions models where individuals are aﬀected by crude
aggregates, whereas social networks models focus on the microstructure of interactions.
Earlier studies such as Besley and Case (1994); Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Mun-
shi (2004) use villages as information networks, (i.e. crude aggregates), while more
recent studies such as Conley and Udry (2010) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006) rely on
self-reported social networks. I will focus on the studies with self-reported networks,
corresponding to the way I measure information networks.
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) study the decision to adopt sunﬂower cultivation in North-
ern Mozambique. They explore adoption within a project using cross-sectional data from
198 households at the year of project implementation. They measure the network by the
number of people the farmer knows who grow sunﬂowers and distinguish between family
and neighbours or friends. They ﬁnd that the number of adopters in the network has an
inverted U-shaped relationship with the propensity to adopt as predicted by the target
input model and interpret the results as an indication of the presence of strategic delay.
There are several obstacles to their identiﬁcation strategy which they also point out in the
paper. They rely heavily on the found inversed U-shaped relationship between number
of adopters in network and own adoption decision. They touch upon issues for identiﬁca-
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tion such as correlation in unobservables within networks, endogenous network formation
leading to reverse causality, and economies of scale in marketing leading to correlation
in choices. However, they argue that these relationships between network and adoption
are all monotone (either positive or negative) and cannot explain the inverted U-shaped
relationship. They further conclude that an inverted U-shape relationship between un-
observed ability and the adoption decision does not seem to drive the results as they are
robust to the omission of the most productive cashew nut cultivators.
One of the most convincing empirical evidence of social learning eﬀects in adoption of
technology is found in the study of Conley and Udry (2010). They study social learning in
the use of fertilizer for pineapple production in Ghana using unbalanced panel data from 15
rounds amounting to 107 changes in fertilizer use by 47 farmers. The information network
of the farmer is constructed by drawing a random sample of seven other individuals from
the sample and asking if the farmer ever has gone to the person for farming advice. They
ﬁnd that farmers respond to bad news in their information network by adjusting fertilizer
use, where bad news is deﬁned as proﬁts below expectations for a given level of fertilizer.
If the farmer receives bad news about the same amount of fertilizer that she applied in
the previous period, she is more likely to change her fertilizer use. If she receives bad
news about a diﬀerent amount of fertilizer than she used previously, she is less likely to
change her own use of fertilizer. In particular, novice farmers are more prone to change
their fertilizer input. The identiﬁcation strategy relies on the panel structure of their
data, where past outcomes in network aﬀect current input decisions. They control for
growing conditions and ﬁnancial neighbourhoods to ensure that these are not driving the
results. Endogenous network formation would not invalidate the identiﬁcation strategy
as they do not consider adoption of pineapple cultivation on the external margin.
Van den Broeck and Dercon (2007) provide a study of social interactions in banana
cultivation in Tanzania. They consider adoption of diﬀerent agricultural techniques within
banana cultivation to stem a decline in yields using full census data from one village
amounting to 119 households surveyed ﬁve times during one year. They both measure
networks as kinship-based, insurance network and geographical neighbours. They ﬁnd
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that technique adoption is positively correlated with average technique adoption in all
three kinds of network, but several caveats apply to this result. The technique adoption
in network is measured contemporaneously which exacerbates the problem of omitted
variables, such as shocks to banana cultivation in the village and correlation in unobserved
individual characteristics within networks. The issue of endogenous network formation is
mainly relevant for the insurance network. Furthermore, to distinguish between imitation
and learning they consider how lagged average banana yield in network is correlated with
current individual banana yield and only ﬁnd a correlation within kinship networks if the
highest productive farmer in network is excluded. Spatial and serial correlation in yields
is not considered which hampers identiﬁcation.
In the light of these empirical studies, I argue that there is scope for more empirical
evidence on the role of social networks in adoption of new technologies.
3 Context
I study the adoption of improved banana cultivation among farmers in the rural parts of
the Arumeru district in northern Tanzania. It is a dry area where cultivation of bananas
using traditional methods is limited because the average precipitation is below what is
usually considered as necessary for banana cultivation.5 In 2006, the Rockwool Initiative
for Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania (RIPAT) project introduced a new way of cultivating
bananas and new banana varieties that made larger scale banana plantations possible in
the semi-arid area under study.6 I will focus on the adoption of banana cultivation among
the farmers that did not participate in the RIPAT project but who live in the villages
where RIPAT was implemented. In that sense, I am studying the second generation
adoption which allows me to shed light on the diﬀusion of a new technology beyond the
project that introduced it. First, I will give an overview of the components of the RIPAT
5The average precipitation in the survey area is 749 mm per year, whereas 1000 mm per year is usually
considered as necessary for banana cultivation.
6The new banana varieties and cultivation method were imported and tested by Dr. Ali Mbwana at
the Selian Agricultural Research Institute in Arusha, Tanzania.
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project to give an understanding of the complex and holistic intervention it has been.
Next, I will describe in more detail the new banana cultivation technology under study.
3.1 RIPAT
RIPAT is a holistic agricultural and livestock project that aims to alleviate food insecurity
and poverty among the participating households. It is designed and implemented by
the local NGO RECODA and funded by the Rockwool Foundation. Up to this date,
four RIPAT projects have been initiated, but this study only considers the ﬁrst RIPAT
project which took place in Arumeru district in Northern Tanzania from 2006 to 2009. The
RIPAT1 has worked as a pilot project for the subsequent three RIPAT projects, where
components of the project have been adjusted according to experience from RIPAT1.
RIPAT2 and RIPAT3 were started in 2008 in Arumeru and Karatu district, respectively,
while RIPAT4 was started in 2009 in Korogwe district, and all three projects are still
ongoing. As I am only using data from RIPAT1 in this paper, I will henceforth refer to
RIPAT1 simply as RIPAT. The following presentation builds upon Maguzu, Ringo, and
Vesterager (forthcoming).
The main idea of RIPAT is to provide a 'basket of option' from which the farmers can
pick the components that best ﬁt their soil, water accessibility, availability of household
labour and land, preferences and taste. The basket consists of the following:
• Cultivation of improved varieties of banana, with new cultivation techniques
• Crop diversiﬁcation, including introduction of improved varieties of planting ma-
terials such as cassava, sweet potatoes, maize, pulses (soya, pigeon pea, lablab,
cowpea) and vegetable production using supplementary irrigation where possible
and appropriate
• Conservation Agriculture (minimum tillage using ox-drawn ripper or special hand
hoes, erosion control using cover crops, etc.)
• Improved animal breeds (cattle, goat, sheep, pigs, poultry), and training in improved
husbandry and veterinary treatment
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• Multipurpose trees for fodder, shade, windbreaks, timber, ﬁrewood, soil fertility,
erosion control and food (fruit trees - avocado, citrus, mango)
• Post-harvesting technologies, i.e. food storage, processing, utilization and marketing
The project follows a Farmer Field School approach with groups of 30-35 farmers cul-
tivating a common plot where the new agricultural techniques are demonstrated. After
learning about the new techniques and improved varieties the participating farmers can
then choose what they want to adopt on their own farm. Seedlings and seeds are made
available free of charge, but pertaining banana seedlings farmers are obliged to pass on
thrice as many seedlings to other farmers as they have received from RECODA. In this
way, a dissemination of the new banana varieties was incorporated in the project. RE-
CODA insisted to have the obligation to disseminate in the project in order to work
against growing donor dependency and expectations of receiving gifts in the area.7
The RIPAT villages were selected in the following way: RECODA asked the District
Oﬃcer to appoint villages that suﬀered most from poverty and food insecurity. An ad-
ditional criterion was that the local leadership was co-operative. I focus on farmers who
were not members of a RIPAT group but still it is useful to understand the self-selection
into the project since the non-RIPAT farmers are not a random sample. Once eight RI-
PAT villages had been chosen, RECODA held a village meeting for all villagers where the
project was introduced, the farmers could sign up if they wanted to join, and two Farmer
Field School groups were formed in each village. RECODA required that participants
were already dealing with agriculture. They should be poor, but still have at least one
acre of land to ensure that they could beneﬁt from the project. An upper limit of ﬁve
acres was mentioned, but not rigorously abided. Participants should be socially acceptable
people who were willing to share with others. RECODA aimed at no less than 50 percent
females with the result that some interested men were asked to let their wives be group
members instead. Finally, it was ensured that all subvillages where represented in the
RIPAT groups in order to facilitate the dissemination of technology and new varieties. In
7There are and has been many development projects in the Arumeru district, and according to RE-
CODA they have aﬀected the expectation in the population to receive gifts and support, creating a
growing dependency on donor charity.
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the end, the village leadership was responsible for the formation of the two groups and in
some villages, they have compromised the poverty criterion and allowed inﬂuential people
to be members of the RIPAT groups.
Keeping the selection into the project in mind, I can conclude that non-RIPAT house-
holds fall in three categories: 1) Households that comply with the criteria, but either
signed up and were not selected due to a l on group size; are not interested in changing
their livelihood; or prefer to wait and see the beneﬁts of the project instead of participat-
ing due to high risk aversion or limited household labour; 2) Households that have too
much land and/or are too rich to become group members; and 3) Households that own
little or no land, and/or social outcasts and drunkards that are not accepted in a RIPAT
group. A comparative analysis of the RIPAT and non-RIPAT households is beyond the
scope of this paper, but I return to the potential eﬀects of self-selection into RIPAT on
the results in section 5.3.
3.2 Improved banana cultivation
This paper focuses on the adoption of improved banana cultivation and hence, it is ap-
propriate to give an introduction to the agricultural technique and the new varieties
introduced with RIPAT.8 First, in order to understand the beneﬁts of banana cultivation,
it is necessary to know a little bit about the agricultural calendar in Northern Tanzania.
There are in principle two rainy seasons: The long rains in March-May which are the
most reliable and the short rains in October-November which are very erratic and only
occur every other year or even less frequently. The most common crops such as maize
and beans are annual crops and can hence be planted once (or twice) a year. Most annual
crops rely on water at a certain point in time, so not only the amount of water but also
the timing of the water is crucial for the crop yield.9 Banana plants are perennial crops
meaning that they do not have to be replanted every year. Only after ten or more years
8This representation is based upon interviews with Dominick Ringo, the Head of RECODA, other
RECODA staﬀ, banana farmers interviewed during pilot testing of the questionnaire and discussions
with Jens Vesterager, Programme Manager at the Rockwool Foundation.
9For instance, maize is harvested 90-120 days after planting, but it is only on day 60-80 that the maize
cob is produced. If the maize ﬁeld is subject to water stress in those 20 days, the maize harvest will fail.
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can it be beneﬁcial to renew the banana plants as their yields will depreciate hereafter. It
takes approximately one year to establish a banana plant and during the ﬁrst 4-6 months
of establishment it requires a regular supply of water. If it is subject to water stress in
this period the plant will dry out. Once the banana plant is established it can go longer
periods without water and is at this point more drought resistant than most annual crops.
It does not fruit if it does not receive water either from rainfall or irrigation but once it
becomes moist after a dry period it will start producing fruits again. This also implies
that if the farmer has access to an irrigation channel or another source of water for irri-
gation the banana plant can fruit several times a year - also in the lean period when the
storage of annual crops might start to run out.
Not many farmers grew bananas in this dry area before RECODA introduced the new
planting technique. As the soil is hard-pan and cannot contain much humidity it calls
for preparation before the banana seedling can grow. One digs a hole of one cubic meter
and ﬁlls it up with a mixture of top soil and manure where one plants no more than
three banana seedlings. There should be three meters distance between the holes in the
plantation. When the banana plant is growing, one stool will grow several suckers. As
long as the banana plant is moist it should be desuckered such that it only has three to
four suckers. The suckers can be fed to animals or sold as seedlings for 500 Tanzanian
Shillings (0.3 US dollars) per seedling.
Five improved banana varieties were distributed, all plantains, but if they are left to
ripe after picking they turn into sweet bananas. The virtues of the improved varieties are
that they respond very well to manure and they grow a shorter trunk than the traditional
varieties implying that they are less vulnerable to wind.
Ideally, I should have been able to distinguish between whether farmers are using
the new technology and/or improved varieties for banana cultivation. Unfortunately, the
questionnaire does not allow us to distinguish between technology and variety but simply
refer to growing improved bananas. I henceforth assume that if a farmer answers that
she grows improved bananas then she has applied the new technology. This assumption
is justiﬁed by anthropological ﬁeld work concluding that it is not possible in this area to
17
3 CONTEXT
establish a banana plantation using the traditional cultivation technique. The results in
the paper are robust to changing the measure of adoption of improved banana cultivation
to only include households that have more than ten banana stools, and hence are most
likely to apply the new cultivation method.
The investment costs related to the establishment of an improved banana plantations
are the opportunity costs of land and labour and potentially the purchase of improved
banana seedlings, if one cannot get hold of them free of charge from RIPAT farmers or
groups. In my sample, 78 percent of the adopting farmers did not pay for their ﬁrst banana
seedling(s). The labour investment related to the establishment of the plantation is large
as it is a very strenuous task to dig the big holes in the hard soil by hand and some farmers
may even choose to hire casual labour to dig the holes at a rate of around 2,000 Tanzanian
Shillings (1.25 US dollars) per hole.10 Establishment of a larger plantation may hence be
costly either in monetary terms or measured in opportunity costs. However, planting
one or two banana plants is manageable and aﬀordable for most farmers and a gradual
expansion of the banana plantation can then be decided upon after testing the banana
plantation on a small scale.
To sum up, I relate improved banana cultivation to the ﬁve characteristics of a new
technology that aﬀects adoption according to Rogers (1995, pp.:17-18). The demonstra-
tion plot of the RIPAT group is typically centrally located and yields are very visible
both at the demonstration plot and the individual farms. The small banana plantations
are particularly conspicuous in the dry areas where they appear as small oases of green
in a dusty light brown landscape. There are no speciﬁc barriers to small scale experi-
mentation, i.e. the new technology has a high degree of trialability. The instructions for
improved banana cultivation consists of a few rules of thumb and do not require special
skills to apply. Hence, the complexity of the technology should not be a high barrier to
adoption. With respect to the compatibility of banana cultivation, Gausset (forthcoming)
found that bananas and plantains are highly valued for both cooking and brewing in the
project area, and they are even a compulsory component of dowry payments among Meru
10As noted by the anthropologist, Quentin Gausset, during ﬁeld studies in the RIPAT villages.
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and Arush people who constitute the vast majority of the population in the area. Thus,
banana cultivation is very compatible with the values and norms in the community. On
these grounds, I will study the perceived relative advantage as aﬀected by the information
network of the farmer in the remainder of the paper.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data collection
The data collection took place in January 2011 and was funded by the Rockwool Founda-
tion. As a consultant, I developed survey instruments, designed the survey and planned
the execution of the data collection and data entry. A thorough description of the data
collection can be found in Appendix A.
The main objective of the data collection was to perform an impact evaluation of
RIPAT, and for this purpose all RIPAT households were interviewed together with a
corresponding number of control households from other villages, which adds up to 2,042
households. In all 38 villages, the local leaders were interviewed about village characteris-
tics and in the 16 RIPAT villages two people from each RIPAT group was also interviewed
about the features of the RIPAT group. In addition, 597 non-participating households
in RIPAT villages were interviewed with the intent to study the dissemination of banana
cultivation. Data on RIPAT and control households were collected both from the RIPAT
1 area in Arumeru District and in the RIPAT 3 area in Karatu District, both situated in
Northern Tanzania. However, the data from non-participating households, which is used
for this study, were only collected in RIPAT 1 villages as the dissemination of banana
cultivation was still very sparse in the RIPAT 3 villages at the time of the data collec-
tion preparations. For more details on the data collection among RIPAT and control
households, see Appendix A.
Random samples of 100 non-participating households from each RIPAT village were
drawn and village leaders were asked about the adoption status of these households.
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According to this information, the average adoption rate in the villages is 13 percent.
However, village adoption rates vary greatly from only three up to a maximum of 23
percent in one village. Because rather few households had adopted improved banana
cultivation in some villages, I would have ended up with a very small sample of adopting
households had I simply drawn a random sample among the non-participating households.
Thus, I aimed at collecting adopting households and non-adopting households in equal
numbers to ensure that the ﬁnal sample would include enough adopting households which
are the households of interest for this study. This corresponds to a case-control study
which is widely used within biomedical literature. I return to the implications for the
econometric analysis of this sampling strategy in section 4.4.1. Though the aim was to
collect adopting and non-adopting households in equal numbers, the sample consists of 224
adopting households and 373 non-adopting households. The main reason for this rather
low number of adopting households is that when I constructed the sample I identiﬁed
households to be growing improved bananas through either the local leadership or through
records held by RECODA. It turned out that 73 households that had been identiﬁed as
adopting did not grow improved bananas when visited during the data collection, while
the reverse was only true for 48 households. For more details, see Appendix A.
As the degree of adoption varied considerably across villages, I decided not to have
the same sample size of non-RIPAT households in each village. I adjusted the sample
according to how many adopting households I could identify in each village such that I
oversampled villages with a high village adoption rate.
Among the non-participating households in the RIPAT villages, the main respondent
to the questionnaire was either the person who took the decision to grow improved bananas
or the person who takes most farming decisions, depending on whether the household had
adopted improved bananas or not. This person was interviewed about his/her personal
characteristics and information network, and about the members of the household, their
farm, crops, livestock, and assets. In addition, the adult female in the household was
interviewed about household facilities and food security, and we took anthropometric
measures of the children in the household under six years of age.
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My main estimation sample is constructed as follows: 597 non-RIPAT households in
eight RIPAT villages were interviewed in total. Out of these, 36 households have missing
data on information network while 15 households have missing data on other explanatory
variables, leaving 546 observations in the sample. The data is not systematically missing
from either adopting or non-adopting households. Eleven of the adopting households have
planted their ﬁrst improved bananas before 2006, the year RIPAT was implemented. I
interpret this as an indication that they have not planted bananas using the new technique
introduced by RECODA and hence they should not be considered as adopting farmers. I
omit these observations from the main analysis, leaving 535 households.11 Furthermore,
15 households moved to the village later than 2006 when RIPAT was implemented. These
households have not been exposed to the same information as households who lived in the
village throughout the period, so I choose to drop these households from the analysis.12
This leaves a ﬁnal sample of 520 households among which 194 are growing improved
bananas.
4.2 Information networks
When constructing a network measure one of the ﬁrst challenges is to specify the bound-
ary of the network under study. Scott and Carrington (2011) summarises three diﬀerent
approaches: A position-based approach where only agents with certain positions are con-
sidered; an event-based approach where agents who had participated in a particular event
are presumed to constitute the relevant population; and a relation-based approach where
the analysis starts with a number of individuals of interest and is expanded by agents
related to these individuals in a speciﬁed manner. The latter approach is particularly ap-
plied in the study of egocentric networks where the networks of certain individuals (egos)
are studied, as opposed to whole networks that focus on all agents within the boundary
(Scott and Carrington, 2011). I choose to measure egocentric networks for two reasons:
Firstly, this is the same type of network measure applied in Bandiera and Rasul (2006)
and Conley and Udry (2010) which are the two empirical papers with direct network mea-
11Including them in the sample as either adopting or non-adopting does not alter the results.
12Including immigrants in the sample does not alter the results.
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sures that come closest to my set-up. Secondly, collecting data on egocentric networks
as opposed to whole network is much less time consuming and hence, less costly. The
measures of the information network are based on the following three recall questions:
Think about your relatives and friends and other people that you know. Before
you decided to start growing improved bananas, how many people did you
discuss farming issues with?
Among these, how many of them were growing improved bananas before you
decided to grow improved bananas?
If any of these are RIPAT farmers, could you please give me their names?
These questions are inspired by the network questions in Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and
Conley and Udry (2010). However, none of them ask for the network size, but I ﬁnd it
important to control for the size of the network to make sure that a correlation between
the network measure and adoption does not occur simply because adopters have larger
networks and hence are more likely to know other banana growers.
The questions are sequential in the sense that the number of farmers mentioned will be
a subset of the number of farmers mentioned in the previous question. This implies that
only RIPAT farmers who grow improved bananas are listed. Henceforth, when I mention
RIPAT farmers in the information network they will implicitly belong to the subset of
RIPAT farmers who grow improved bananas.
The wording above is the questions posed to the adopting farmers. The questions to
the non-adopting farmers do not refer to the time before you decided to start growing
improved bananas and are phrased in present tense. That is, the network measure does
not refer to the same time for adopting and non-adopting farmers. I argue that this
would cause a downward bias (if any) in the estimate of the eﬀect of network on adoption
since I expect a positive trend in the number of banana growers in a given network over
the period. Conditional on the network size, a positive trend would cause non-adopting
farmers to have relatively more banana growers in their network than adopting farmers,
ceteris paribus, as their network measure refers to a later point in time.
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There are several reasons for the speciﬁc time reference applied in the network ques-
tions. First of all, if I had asked for the current network it is most likely that the network
measure would have been endogenous. Obviously, adopting farmers could start discussing
farming issues with other banana growers once they had adopted. Had I instead asked a
recall question about the network prior to project implementation, no one in the network
would be growing improved bananas. I could have asked about the adoption history of
this prior network, but I considered that too complicated and time consuming. The cho-
sen phrasing has the virtue of being simple and easy to understand and remember. One
drawback could be if farmers who were interested in improved banana cultivation, started
discussing with other banana growers before taking the decision to adopt and mentioned
these farmers when asked the above questions. I return to this issue in section 5.1.
Other applications exploit variation in the strength of the tie in the network referring
back to the seminal work of Granovetter (1973) who distinguish between strong and weak
ties as measured for instance by the amount of time spent in the relationship. Kremer
and Miguel (2007, p.:1025) measure social links, e.g. as the ﬁve friends they speak with
most frequently to capture the closest social links, while Bandiera and Rasul (2006)
distinguish between family and friends in the network. I have not collected data on the
type or strength of the tie due to tight budget constraints in the data collection. I could
calculate the geographical distances to RIPAT farmers in network using Global Positioning
System (GPS) data, but that measure of the strength of the tie would be correlated with
the growing conditions that the farmers face (see section 5.3).
Turning to the data, Figure 4.1 shows the network size and the number of RIPAT
farmers in network for adopting and non-adopting farmers, respectively. The distribution
of network size presented in Figure 4.1A is not too diﬀerent across adopting and non-
adopting farmers, though a larger share of non-adopting farmers do not discuss farming
issues with anyone, i.e. have a network size equal to zero. In addition, Table 4.1 shows
that the mean network size is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the two groups.13 On the other
13This is robust to exclusion of the ﬁve households with 20 or more people in their network. However,
if I only consider farmers with less than six farmers in their network, which is 92 percent of the sample,
adopting farmers have a signiﬁcantly larger network than non-adopters.
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Figure 4.1: Network and adoption
A. Number of farmers in network B. Number of RIPAT farmers in network
Note: Data from ﬁve households with 20 or more farmers in their network are excluded in the two ﬁgures.
hand, Figure 4.1B provides a clear picture: adopting farmers have more RIPAT farmers
in their information network than non-adopting farmers, which is also conﬁrmed in Table
4.1. The t-test of equal means is rejected at any relevant signiﬁcance level. The table
also shows that adopting farmers discuss farming issues with more non-RIPAT banana
growers than non-adopting farmers, a diﬀerence that is just signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent
level.
4.3 Other observable characteristics
Table 4.1 summarises the observable farmer and household characteristics that are relevant
for adoption of improved banana cultivation, divided by adoption status. The last column
gives the p-value from a t-test of equal means for adopting and non-adopting households.
I distinguish between farmer and household level characteristics. At the farmer level, I
control for the usual suspects of gender, age, literacy, numeracy and religion. In addition,
I follow Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and control for whether the farmer participates in an
NGO project (other than RIPAT) or has participated in the past. Table 4.1 shows that
adopting and non-adopting farmers are equally likely to be female farmers and there is
not a signiﬁcant age diﬀerential between the two groups. They are also equally likely to
be literate and have a certain level of numeracy. The farmer's reading and math skills
shows to be unimportant for adoption and is hence only included as a robustness check
and not in the main analysis. Catholic farmers are signiﬁcantly more likely to adopt
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Network variables Full sample Adopting Non-adopting P-value
No. of RIPAT banana growers 0.51 (0.90) 0.95 (1.09) 0.25 (0.63) 0.000
No. of non-RIPAT banana growers 0.32 (1.86) 0.54 (2.73) 0.19 (1.03) 0.040
Network size 2.81 (4.08) 2.95 (3.78) 2.73 (4.26) 0.541
Farmer characteristics Full sample Adopting Non-adopting P-value
Farmer is female 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.748
Age of farmer 44.78 (15.61) 43.93 (13.28) 45.29 (16.85) 0.340
Farmer can read* 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.243
Farmer is good at math* 0.39 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.429
Farmer is Catholic 0.08 (0.28) 0.11 (0.32) 0.06 (0.25) 0.050
Farmer is Muslim 0.05 (0.23) 0.03 (0.16) 0.07 (0.26) 0.029
Farmer has other religion 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.44) 0.24 (0.43) 0.794
Participates in NGO project 0.24 (0.43) 0.27 (0.45) 0.21 (0.41) 0.130
Household characteristics Full sample Adopting Non-adopting P-value
Highest education level, years 7.78 (2.24) 8.11 (2.11) 7.58 (2.30) 0.009
Household labour in persons 2.53 (1.50) 2.83 (1.61) 2.35 (1.40) 0.000
Head of household is widow(er) 0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.23) 0.11 (0.32) 0.030
Wealth (poverty score) 44.13 (15.05) 46.19 (14.70) 42.90 (15.15) 0.016
Owns mobile phone* 0.61 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49) 0.533
Number of acres in 2006 4.18 (5.99) 4.10 (4.35) 4.23 (6.78) 0.819
Has grown traditional bananas 0.36 (0.48) 0.46 (0.50) 0.30 (0.46) 0.000
Number of crops grown in 2010 3.94 (1.91) 4.43 (1.93) 3.65 (1.85) 0.000
Grows improved maize in 2009* 0.52 (0.50) 0.66 (0.48) 0.44 (0.50) 0.000
Grows traditional maize in 2009* 0.66 (0.47) 0.56 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45) 0.000
Grows beans in 2009* 0.79 (0.40) 0.86 (0.35) 0.76 (0.43) 0.007
Grows vegetables in 2009* 0.43 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.36 (0.48) 0.000
No. banana growers within 0.5km 10.57 (8.40) 13.40 (8.63) 8.89 (7.80) 0.000
Use irrigation channel* 0.91 (0.29) 0.96 (0.20) 0.88 (0.33) 0.002
Average yearly rainfall in mm* 749.31 (50.54) 746.90 (39.05) 750.78 (56.40) 0.402
Dist. to nearest waterway, km* 1.17 (0.88) 1.13 (0.75) 1.19 (0.95) 0.400
Placebo outcomes Full sample Adopting Non-adopting P-value
Grows vegetables in 2010 0.50 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50) 0.000
Grows sunﬂower in 2010 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.36) 0.12 (0.32) 0.279
Grows sugarcane in 2010 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22) 0.006
Observations 520 194 326
Notes: Sample means, standard deviations in parantheses. Last column: P-value from t-test of equal
means across adoption. Farmer and household characteristics marked with an asteriks (*) are not included
in the baseline speciﬁcation.
compared to Protestants on average, whereas Muslim farmers are signiﬁcantly less likely
to adopt. There is no diﬀerence in the propensity to adopt among other religions which is
a combined group of both traditional religion practitioners, Seventh Day Adventists and
other groups that do not fall into the three main religion groups. Bandiera and Rasul
(2006) ﬁnd that a larger share of adopting farmers participate or have participated in
other NGO projects compared to non-adopters, but there is not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
project participation across adoption status in these data.
At the household level I consider diﬀerent components of the household structure,
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namely the highest education level obtained, available household labour, whether the
household head is a widow(er), the wealth of the household, and the farm size. This
range of variables address constraints to adoption with respect to inputs to agricultural
production: capital, labour, human capital, and land. In addition, I control for household
ownership of a mobile phone which may capture access to information other than through
information network. I further include variables that capture agricultural practices and
growing conditions that may correlate with both network and adoption.
Adopting households have achieved signiﬁcantly higher education levels than non-
adopting households. They also have signiﬁcantly more household labour accessible which
is measured by the number of household members who can do hard manual labour to full
extent. There are signiﬁcantly fewer widow(er)s among adopting households and they
are also signiﬁcantly more wealthy, where wealth is measured by a Tanzanian poverty
score developed by Schreiner (2011). Ownership of a mobile phone could capture access
to information and aﬀect the information network, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
across adoption status. Neither is their a diﬀerence in the farm size of adopting and non-
adopting households as measured in 2006. I choose to include acreage in 2006 instead of in
2011 due to the potential endogeneity of the farm size: if banana cultivation is proﬁtable
then early adopters may have expanded their farm.14 Diﬀerent agricultural practices
are highly correlated with adoption. Households that grow or have grown traditional
bananas and households that grow a higher number of diﬀerent crops (net of traditional
and improved bananas) are both more likely to adopt improved banana cultivation. The
number of diﬀerent crops grown can both capture preferences for diversiﬁcation of risk and
an entrepreneurial spirit among household members. To check if adoption only takes place
within groups of farmers who grew another crop prior to adoption, I control for cultivation
of improved and traditional maize, beans and vegetables in 2009. Adopting households
are signiﬁcantly more likely to grow improved maize, beans and vegetables and less likely
to grow traditional maize than non-adopting households. The number of banana growers
14As 97.5 percent of the sample owns at least some of their land and 83.9 percent owns all of the
crop land they cultivate, inadequate incentives with respect to farm tenure arrangements should not be
a constraint. Hence, I do not distinguish between whether the household owns or rent in the land that
they cultivate.
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within a radius of 0.5 kilometres from the household is signiﬁcantly higher for adopting
than non-adopting households. It is captured by the number of banana growers in our
sample within 0.5 kilometres from the household where distance is measured as distance
between GPS points taken at the household's compound. As we have not collected census
data the measure is not complete, but it is a good proxy for the growing conditions that
the household faces.15 The use of irrigation channels is more common among adopting
households, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between adopting and non-adopting
households in historical rainfall or distance to the nearest waterway. 16
The last panel in Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the outcomes
variables used for the placebo study. Half of the sample grows vegetables while only 13
percent grows sunﬂowers and eight percent grows sugarcane in the sample. It appears
that vegetable and sugarcane cultivation is positively correlated with improved banana
cultivation while sunﬂower cultivation is not.
4.4 Methodology
I analyse the impact of the number of banana growers in a farmer's network on the farmer's
propensity to adopt, using a latent variable approach. I choose not to distinguish between
the farmer and household level and use the index i for both levels, as I only have data
on one farmer in each household. I do not explicitly model through which channels
the information network aﬀects the perceived relative proﬁtability of banana cultivation,
a∗i,t, but I lean on the implications of the theoretical models summarised in section 2.3.
Whenever the farmer perceives banana cultivation to be more proﬁtable than alternative
crops (a∗i,t > 0), the farmer will choose to adopt, where the observed binary adoption
choice is denoted ai,t:
15Once the number of banana growers within a 0.5km radius is controlled for, use of irrigation channel,
historical rainfall at the household level and distance to nearest waterway becomes insigniﬁcant.
16Historical rainfall data is compiled by Hijmans, Cameron, Parra, Jones, and Jarvis (2005).
They have interpolated data on precipitation from the period 1950-2000 down to a resolu-
tion of 1x1 km using the thin-plate smoothing spline algorithm implemented in the ANUS-
PLIN package for interpolation, using latitude, longitude, and elevation as independent vari-
ables. The data is available from http://www.worldclim.org/. Data on waterways is available at
http://download.geofabrik.de/osm/africa/, and distance from household to the nearest waterway is cal-
culated using the 'geodist' package in Stata.
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a∗i,t = f(Ni,t−1, Ri,t−1, Bi,t−1, X¯−i, Xi, Gi, αs, ηi)
ai,t = 1(a
∗
i,t > 0)
The perceived relative proﬁtability of banana cultivation is aﬀected by the network
through diﬀerent channels: The size of the network, Ni,t−1, and the numbers of banana
growing RIPAT farmers and non-RIPAT farmers in the network, Ri,t−1 and Bi,t−1, respec-
tively. All three measures are indexed with t − 1 to indicate that they refer to the time
prior to the adoption decision for the adopting farmers. Generally, the models summarised
in section 2.3 imply a positive relationship between the number of adopters in the network
and the propensity to adopt, at least for low numbers of adopters in the network. For
higher levels of adoption in network, the target input model implies a decreasing marginal
eﬀect due to strategic delay. These eﬀects are denoted endogenous eﬀects in the termi-
nology employed by Manski (1993). Furthermore, perceived relative proﬁtability can be
aﬀected by networks through contextual eﬀects, which refer to the impact of the average
farmer and household characteristics in the network, here captured by X¯−i. In applica-
tions where networks are measured by a position- or event-based approach, (e.g. studies
of peer eﬀects in a classroom), it is common to have data on X¯−i, (e.g. average family
income among class members), but in studies of ego-centric networks it is more rare and
to my knowledge, Van den Broeck and Dercon (2007) is the only study within adoption of
agricultural technologies in developing countries, that has data to on the characteristics
of the network members. As I only have data on characteristics of the RIPAT farmers
in the network, I cannot control for X¯−i, which is why it is excluded from the empirical
speciﬁcation below. I return to the matter in section 5.2.
In addition, the farmers perception of the relative proﬁtability of banana cultivation
is aﬀected by farmer and household characteristics, Xi, growing conditions, Gi, subvillage
characteristics, αs,
17 and individual unobserved characteristics, ηi, where s denotes the
17A village is divided into two to ﬁve subvillages, each constituting a political unit with a local subvillage
leader. There are 24 subvillages in the data. In some villages, the subvillages are contiguous, but in other
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subvillage of farmer i. Though these four groups of characteristics may vary over time,
they are not indexed by t as they are assumed constant in the period from introduction
of RIPAT in 2006 until data collection 2011.
In order to estimate the partial eﬀects I assume that the factors aﬀect the perceived
proﬁtability linearly:
a∗i,t = β1Ri,t−1 + β2Bi,t−1 + β3Ni,t−1 + δXi + γGi + αs + ηi
I will relax the assumption of linearity of the network variables to investigate the role
of strategic delay in section 6.2. Assuming that η is logistically distributed, I can write
the propensity to adopt as
P (ai,t = 1) = P (ηi > −(θZi + αs)) = Λ(θZi + αs) = exp(θZi + αs)
1 + exp(θZi + αs)
,
where θZi = β1Ri,t−1+β2Bi,t−1+β3Ni,t−1+δXi+γGi and αs is treated as ﬁxed eﬀects.
I can then retrieve the logit coeﬃcients by Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
4.4.1 The logit model
There are two reasons to apply the logit model. The primary reason is that case-control
data only results in inconsistency of the constant term estimated in the logit model while
the logit parameters of the covariates are consistently estimated. Secondarily, the logit
model is convenient for handling ﬁxed eﬀects with a binary outcome variable.
Case-control data is common within epidemiology, because one would need enormous
random samples in order to study diseases that are not very frequent in the population.
The seminal paper in the biomedical literature on the subject is written by Prentice
and Pyke (1979) who show that logistic regression coeﬃcients and odds ratios are esti-
mated consistently by applying the original logistic regression model to case-control data.
Maddala (1991, p.:793) argues that the results from Prentice and Pyke (1979) cannot
villages there is a larger distance in between subvillages and soil quality may diﬀer across subvillages
within the same village. Hence, I control for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects instead of village ﬁxed eﬀects.
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be generalised to the probit estimator or the linear probability model. The sampling
method of case-control data is referred to as choice-based sampling within the economics
literature, as the sampling method is relevant when considering discrete choices that are
rare in the population. Within this strand of literature, McFadden (1973) is the ﬁrst to
show the virtues of the logistic regression with choice-based sampling as acknowledged by
Manski and Lerman (1977). Appendix B derives the consistency of the logistic regression
coeﬃcients in the case of choice-based sampling and subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects.
The ﬁxed eﬀects methods applied to linear models are not straight-forward to gen-
eralise to non-linear models, because they exactly exploit linearity to make unobserved
elements cancel out. Due to the functional form of the logit model, it is possible to ﬁnd
the conditional joint distribution of the outcomes in a cluster that does not depend on
the unobserved cluster ﬁxed eﬀect Chamberlain (1982).18 Only observations in clusters
with variation in the outcome contribute to the estimation of the parameters and the log
likelihood function will be the sum of the conditional log likelihoods for each cluster.
Marginal eﬀects cannot be computed when accounting for ﬁxed eﬀects, but it is actu-
ally possible to calculate the marginal eﬀects from estimates based on case-control data
(without ﬁxed eﬀects) by correcting for the propensity to adopt in the population. Even
though the data allows me to estimate the adoption propensity in the population, I refrain
from such calculations and restrict the analysis to consider sign, signiﬁcance and relative
magnitude of the logistic regression coeﬃcients.19
18The conditional logit model assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous conditional
on the ﬁxed eﬀect, and that the outcomes are independent conditional on the explanatory variables and
the ﬁxed eﬀect.
19For marginal changes the relative magnitude of the logistic coeﬃcients corresponds to the relative
marginal eﬀects. Proof: Let Ω = β1Ri,t−1+β2Bi,t−1+β3Ni,t−1+δXi+γGi+αs. The ﬁrst derivative of the
logistic distribution function with respect to Ri is ∂Λ(Ω)/∂Ri = [β1exp(Ω)(1+exp(Ω))−β1exp(Ω)
2]/[1+exp(Ω)]2 =
β1exp(Ω)/[1+exp(Ω)]2 and corresponding for Bi. Hence, [∂Λ(Ω)/∂Ri]/[∂Λ(Ω)/∂Bi] = β1/β2. For discrete variables,
this will only be an approximation.
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5 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of social learning eﬀects is inherently diﬃcult because most networks are
endogenously shaped through individual choices. Exogenous variation in the network can
facilitate identiﬁcation, but that requires either a randomised intervention or a natural
experiment, which is not present in my data. In this section I will go through all the
diﬀerent causes of correlated behaviour which cannot be assigned to social learning and
describe how I address them in my econometric analysis.
I consider an ego-centric network that is captured prior to the adoption decision by
a recall question which makes it less likely to have reverse causality from adoption to
the network measure. If the network was measured contemporaneously then a correlation
between banana growers in network and adoption behaviour could simply be due to the
fact that once a farmer has adopted she would start discussing farming issues with other
banana growers. I further address the issue of reverse causality in section 5.1. I want
to distinguish endogenous social eﬀects from exogenous social eﬀects, where the former
describes the eﬀect of behaviour in network on the adoption decision of the individual.
The latter describes the eﬀect of exogenous characteristics such as education and wealth
on the individual adoption behaviour.20 Following Manski (1993, 2000), these are termed
contextual eﬀects and they are treated in section 5.2. Endogenous network formation
naturally leads to a correlation in individual unobserved characteristics if similar peo-
ple prefer to share information. In addition, behaviour may be spatially correlated due
to growing conditions or institutions. Manski calls these confounding factors correlated
eﬀects and I address them in section 5.3.
When studying the impact of the information network on adoption behaviour, I cannot
distinguish imitative behaviour from learning as pointed out by Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995). In order to distinguish between imitation and learning I would need data on
productivity which I do not have. Nevertheless, if I assume that farmers are rational,
adoption must indicate that they perceive improved banana cultivation to be relatively
20Manski (1993) uses the word exogenous, however, it should be noted that if networks are endoge-
nously formed then the characteristics of network members may be endogenous too.
31
5 IDENTIFICATION
advantageous either with respect to proﬁts, household food security or social factors such
as prestige.
5.1 Reverse causality
The way I measure information networks makes it important to consider whether these
networks are endogenous to the adoption decision. A farmer who is initially interested in
banana cultivation (has a high ηi) could start discussing farming issues with other banana
farmers before making the ﬁnal decision. If she reports these people when asked during
the survey, then my network measure would be endogenous, ηi → Ri,t−1, Bi,t−1. Another
problem could be if the adopting farmers do not recall correctly who they discussed
farming issues with before they decided to adopt. Thus, my network measure could also
be endogenous if they mistakenly mention people they befriended after adoption.
A way to test for this is to exploit the existence of super farmers in the project
villages. These are farmers that have been especially trained by RECODA to teach other
farmers how to grow bananas. They are selected by the groups themselves among the
best farmers to practice and teach farmers the new methods. The super farmers received
special training in June-July 2007, and they were expected to serve both their own groups
and the wider community as paraprofessional consultants. Two of the eight villages do
not have a super farmer and one of the villages actually has two super farmers. In the
following, I disregard the two villages without a super farmer.
These super farmers would be the natural person to turn to for questions about im-
proved banana cultivation before you decide to adopt banana cultivation on your own
farm. Hence, they provide an obvious opportunity for testing the described endogeneity.
If the reverse causality from adoption to network is present, it should be that the super
farmers are better represented in the information networks of the adopting non-RIPAT
farmers than regular RIPAT farmers that grow bananas. I test this implication in a dyadic
framework.
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Table 5.1: Dyads and links
Link
Dyad between adopting farmer and ... No Yes Total
... super farmer 924 14 938
... regular RIPAT farmer 6,204 85 6,289
Total 7,128 99 7,227
5.1.1 Dyads
I consider all possible dyads which are pairs of RIPAT farmers (including super farmers)
and adopting non-RIPAT farmers within a village.21 I only consider adopting farmers
as the described endogeneity is mainly relevant for this group. I disregard 25 adopting
farmers who adopted before the third quarter of 2007, because at this point in time super
farmers were not trained yet and hence, the test would not apply to the information
network of these farmers. This results in a data set with 7,227 dyads where 938 of them
include a super farmer. A link exists if the adopting farmer discusses farming issues with
the RIPAT farmer, which is the case in 99 dyads and 14 of these involve a super farmer. I
test whether the proportion of links is larger given that the dyad includes a super farmer
than given that the dyad includes a regular RIPAT farmer.
5.1.2 Test of equal proportions
Let ps denote the probability of a link in a dyad given that the RIPAT farmer is super
farmer and let pr denote the probability of a link in a dyad given that it includes a regular
RIPAT farmer. I then want to test the following hypothesis,
H0 : pr = ps, H1 : pr < ps
Acceptance of the null hypothesis that the probability of a super farmer link is the
same as the probability of a regular RIPAT farmer link would indicate that my network
measure is not subject to the described endogeneity. I test against a one-sided alternative
21Only two farmers discuss farming issues with RIPAT farmers from another village than their own,
and these RIPAT farmers are not super farmers. Hence, restricting the dyads to only include pairs within
villages does not alter the results of the analysis.
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both because this is the relevant alternative hypothesis, but also because it is the most
conservative test as I want to challenge the null hypothesis.
I estimate the probabilities by the sample proportions, e.g. the number of links be-
tween adopting farmers and super farmers divided by the total number of dyads between
adopting and super farmers. I then test whether they are equal by setting up a test statis-
tic following Berry and Lindgren (1996, p.: 493), assuming that the links are independent,
Z =
pˆs − pˆr√
pˆ(1− pˆ)( 1
Ns
+ 1
Nr
)
, pˆ =
Nspˆs +Nrpˆr
Ns +Nr
,
where pˆs and pˆr are the sample proportions of super farmer links and regular RIPAT
farmer links, respectively, and Ns and Nr denote the number of dyads with super farmers
and regular RIPAT farmers, respectively. Asymptotically, the Z test statistic follows a
standard normal distribution.22
Table 5.2: Super farmer tests
pˆs pˆr Z p-value
Full sample 1.49 1.35 0.346 0.365
Kwaugoro 2.49 1.83 0.939 0.174
Marurani 1.16 1.01 0.227 0.410
Table 5.2 shows the proportions along with the value of the test statistic and the
p-value for the one-sided alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis is accepted at any
reasonable signiﬁcance level with a p-value of 0.365 for the full sample. This test assumes
homogeneity in the proportions across villages which may not be reasonable to assume.
I relax this assumption by considering the villages separately, however, in four of the
villages none of the super farmers were known by the adopting farmers prior to the
adoption decision. Hence, a formal test is not meaningful for these villages. Table 5.2
includes separate tests for the two villages were links between adopting farmers and super
farmers exist, namely Kwaugoro and Marurani. Though the super farmers in Kwaugoro
appear to be more known than the regular RIPAT farmers,23 the proportions are not
22Though the sample sizes are relatively large, the normal approximation for Z may be rather inaccurate
as the probabilities are quite small. The results could be veriﬁed with an exact binomial test.
23Kwaugoro is the village with two super farmers.
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even signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at a ten percent level. The test for Marurani further supports
the hypothesis that adopting farmers are not more likely to discuss farming issues with a
super farmer than with a regular RIPAT farmer prior to the adoption decision.
Given that the super farmers are selected among the best farmers to practice and teach
others, they are likely to be well known in the village prior to being appointed as super
farmer. This implies that even in absence of reverse causality I would expect to ﬁnd that
super farmers are better represented in networks of adopting farmers than regular RIPAT
farmers. As I ﬁnd that they are not more likely to be known than a regular RIPAT farmer,
this only supports the hypothesis of no reverse causality going from adoption to network
formation. It is diﬃcult to think of an argument why the appointed super farmers would
be less known in the local communities than other RIPAT farmers.
The test suggests that a reverse causality between adoption and network should not be
a major concern for the analysis. However, the test remains indicative as it only applies
to network formation with super farmers and not with other RIPAT farmers.
5.2 Contextual eﬀects
To be able to draw conclusions on the presence of social learning it is important to dis-
tinguish between the endogenous social interaction eﬀects and the contextual eﬀects. If
the farmer's adoption decision is aﬀected by the characteristics of network members re-
gardless of the adoption behaviour of the network members then these characteristics
would confound the social learning eﬀect. For instance, if banana growers are on average
wealthier than other farmers, then knowing several banana growers implies knowing sev-
eral wealthy people who may provide informal credit or insurance for you. In that case, a
positive correlation between the number of banana growers in network and own adoption
is not an evidence for learning but confounded by access to informal credit.
Ideally, I would like to control for the average characteristics of the information net-
work members (X¯−i) to ensure that the correlation between adoption and the adoption
behaviour in the network is not driven by exogenous characteristics of network members.
However, I only have detailed information about the RIPAT farmers in the network and
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not other network members.24 To the extent that exogenous characteristics are highly cor-
related within the network, controlling for farmer characteristics (X) that are expected
to aﬀect adoption partly resolves the issue. But it is not suﬃcient in the case of het-
erogeneous networks. I do not have data on all network members, but I can exploit the
detailed data I have on RIPAT farmers. That allows me to distinguish between knowing
wealthier or poorer RIPAT farmers, older or younger, less or more educated, women or
men, to see if the eﬀects are heterogeneous. Heterogeneous eﬀects could suggest that the
results are driven by contextual eﬀects.
5.3 Correlated eﬀects
I distinguish between correlated eﬀects due to environment (Gi, αs) or individual unob-
served characteristics (ηi).
Farmers within a network may behave similarly because they face the same environ-
ment. Agricultural activities may be correlated for neighbouring farmers due to similar
growing conditions rather than social network eﬀects. If farmer j is a RIPAT farmer in
farmer i's network then correlations in Gi and Gj will cause a spurious correlation be-
tween Ri,t−1 and a∗i,t when Gi is not controlled for. If the village leadership is supporting
and promoting banana cultivation in a particular village then a correlation in adoption
behaviour within networks in the village would not necessarily indicate the existence of
social network eﬀects. If αs is not controlled for then the correlation between Ri,t−1 and
a∗i,t will be upward biased provided that the RIPAT farmers in farmer i's network are from
the same village as farmer i. I address these issues in several ways.
I capture the growing conditions of a farmer by the number of banana growers in
my sample within a radius of 0.5 kilometres from the farmer's dwelling as measured by
GPS,25 and I ﬁnd this measure to be an important determinant of adoption. The GPS
measure is taken at the household dwelling and not at the farmer's plot(s), but this should
24Bandiera and Rasul (2006) do not have data on the characteristics of network members either.
They claim that the U-shaped relationship found between adoption and network cannot be explained by
contextual eﬀects as they would be monotone. To my knowledge, the only paper analysing adoption of
agricultural technologies and networks with detailed information on network members is that of Van den
Broeck and Dercon (2007).
25The distance is calculated using the 'geodist' package in Stata.
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not add too much noise as the majority of households have plots that are contiguous to
their dwelling. As all RIPAT farmers are interviewed and in some villages all identiﬁed
adopting farmers are interviewed, this measure almost corresponds to the actual number
of banana growers within a radius of half a kilometre. However, in the villages where
adoption is very wide spread so that the sample does not include all adopting households
in the village, it understates the number of adopters within the radius. This is somewhat
problematic since it will not capture the full eﬀect of growing conditions in these villages.
To mitigate this problem, I could additionally control for the historical rainfall within
one square kilometre of the household, the distance from the household to the nearest
waterway and whether the household uses an irrigation channel. However, I do not ﬁnd
any of these measures to be important for adoption once the number of neighbouring
adopters is controlled for, neither does inclusion of them aﬀect the estimated network
eﬀects. I hence consider the measure of adopters within a small radius to be capturing
the growing conditions of the farmer. To capture institutional eﬀects I include subvillage
ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁxed eﬀects also capture general equilibrium eﬀects such as the eﬀect
of wide spread adoption in the local market price of bananas.26
Another important correlated eﬀect stems from the likely correlation of unobserved
individual characteristics within networks which are formed by individual choice. En-
trepreneurial farmers may ﬁrst of all have larger networks and hence, be more likely to
know adopting farmers. Thus, I control for network size in all regressions. For a given
network size, an entrepreneurial farmer may choose to discuss farming issues with other
farmers who are themselves entrepreneurial. Hence, a correlation between their adoption
behaviour may simply reﬂect that they are of the same type rather than being an indica-
tion of social learning eﬀects. If eligibility into RIPAT had been randomised, I could have
used the random variation in the network of the non-eligible farmers to circumvent this
problem (see e.g. Kremer and Miguel, 2007). But because participation in RIPAT was
voluntary I must address the potential correlation of unobservables within the network. I
do that by performing a placebo study described in section 5.3.1.
26However, it should be noted that the majority of farmers face periods of food insecurity and mainly
grow bananas for home consumption.
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The self-selection into RIPAT creates an additional concern. A farmer who knew many
farmers who signed up for RIPAT could have chosen not to sign up simply because she
knew that she would learn about the new technologies anyway. Since participation in RI-
PAT required weekly participation in meetings and joint cultivation of the demonstration
plot and hence, many work hours, it is a reasonable concern that some farmers who were
initially interested in improved banana cultivation could have chosen not to sign up for
RIPAT, because several of their network members had done so. This corresponds to the
idea of strategic delay derived from the target input model where a farmer would choose
to postpone adoption if she knows suﬃciently many adopters allowing her to learn from
their experimentation without incurring the cost of experimenting herself. Similarly, a
farmer could avoid the opportunity cost of labour related to RIPAT participation if one
or more network members had chosen to participate from whom she could get improved
banana seedlings and instructions.
If I assume that these farmers would adopt banana cultivation relatively early since
they were interested in banana cultivation already at the start of the project, I can split
the sample of adopters into early and late adopters to see if there are diﬀerential eﬀects.
If the network eﬀects only persist among early adopters, they may simply be generated
by self-selection mechanisms into RIPAT.
5.3.1 Placebo study
Consider the following situation: Farmer i likes to discuss farming issues with farmer j,
because they are both open to new ideas and like to try out new crops on their farm.
Farmer j chooses to join RIPAT and establish a banana plantation and while farmer i
chooses to plant improved bananas with the help from a super farmer. In this case, no
social learning takes place but adoption behaviour of farmer i and farmer j is correlated
because of a correlation in ηi and ηj. To examine if the strong correlation I ﬁnd between
adoption behaviour and adopters in network is driven by correlation of unobservables I
consider adoption of three other crops: vegetables, sunﬂowers and sugarcanes which are
all proﬁtable cash crops.
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Cultivation of vegetables (e.g. onions, tomatoes) is very proﬁtable but also requires
access to water and intensive seasonal labour input. Sunﬂowers can be grown under
rather dry conditions and the sunﬂower oil can be extracted from the seeds with a simple
hand press. Sugar cane is a perennial grass that can be grown under varying conditions
but access to irrigation water increases yields.27 If the proﬁtability of banana cultivation
dominates the proﬁtability of vegetables, sunﬂowers and sugarcanes for all farmers then
the placebo test has no bite. However, I would argue that this is not the case. Farmers who
have access to plenty of water would proﬁt more from vegetables than bananas whereas
it might be more beneﬁcial to grow sunﬂowers for farmers who have very limited access
to water. I have chosen these three crops because their proﬁtability relative to banana
cultivation varies across farmers conditional on their available inputs. It is not clear that
banana cultivation would dominate the cultivation of any of these crops for all farmers.
If the correlation between the number of banana growers in network and adoption
of banana cultivation is driven by a correlation of unobservables in the network I would
expect the number of banana growers in network to explain variation in the adoption of
vegetables, sunﬂowers and sugarcanes. If knowing more RIPAT farmers is simply a proxy
for being more open to new ideas then it should be correlated with the adoption of other
crops. Results are presented in section 7.
6 Results and robustness
6.1 Results from baseline speciﬁcation
Estimated logistic coeﬃcients from the baseline model are shown in Table 6.1. Column
(1) presents the simple logistic regression of the propensity to adopt on the three network
variables. Discussing farming issues with a banana grower  whether RIPAT or non-
RIPAT  is positively correlated with the decision to adopt and the estimated parameters
are both signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. However, knowing an
extra RIPAT farmer appears to be ﬁve to six times as important as knowing an extra non-
27Information on cultivation of vegetables, sunﬂowers and sugarcanes is based on conversations with
Jens Vesterager, Programme Manager, Rockwool Foundation.
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RIPAT farmer who grows improved bananas, given network size, and it is even statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Network size is not positively correlated with adoption
when banana growers in network are controlled for.
In column (2) I include farmer and household characteristics and report conditional
logit estimates where subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for as described in section
4.4.1. Since these parameters are only identiﬁed by variation within subvillages, factors
that cause adoption rates to be correlated within subvillages such as soil quality, distance
to markets and village institutions are not confounding the network eﬀects. The number
of observations is reduced by six households because one subvillage does not have any
adopting farmers in the sample.
The estimated parameters for the network variables change less than a standard er-
ror from the simple regression. In this speciﬁcation, knowing a RIPAT banana grower
is approximately four times more important for the adoption decision than knowing a
non-RIPAT banana grower. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the one percent level while the
impact of knowing a non-RIPAT banana grower is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the ﬁve percent level. So even though I control for a range of farmer and household
characteristics and only exploit the variation within subvillages the number of banana
growers in the network persists to be strongly correlated with the adoption decision. The
network size is now signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with adoption given the number
of banana growers in network which is a bit surprising. I would have expected farmers
who are more entrepreneurial to have larger networks and also to be more prone to adopt
improved banana cultivation. On the contrary, it appears that discussing farming issues
with other people than banana growers makes a farmer less likely to adopt. I will return
to this issue in section 6.4.28
Turning to farmer characteristics, female farmers are signiﬁcantly more prone to adopt
improved banana cultivation than male farmers and this eﬀect is quite strong approxi-
mately corresponding to knowing three non-RIPAT banana growers as compared to none.
28If network size is excluded from the model, RIPAT banana growers in network still have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect at the one percent level with a coeﬃcient of 0.857 corresponding to the model in
column (2). However, the number of non-RIPAT banana growers in network no longer has a signiﬁcant
impact on adoption. See results in Appendix C.
40
6 RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS
Table 6.1: Adoption of improved banana cultivation, baseline
speciﬁcation
(1) (2)
Network variables
RIPAT banana growers in network 1.155∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.174)
Non-RIPAT banana growers in network 0.208∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.104) (0.101)
Network size -0.125 -0.200∗∗∗
(0.0759) (0.0582)
Farmer characteristics
Farmer is female 0.802∗∗
(0.341)
Age of farmer 0.0552
(0.0483)
Age of farmer, squared /100 -0.0617
(0.0466)
Farmer is Catholic 1.018∗∗
(0.450)
Farmer is Muslim -0.135
(0.605)
Farmer has other religion -0.154
(0.306)
Participates in NGO project 0.0256
(0.291)
Household characteristics
Highest education level, years 0.0331
(0.0674)
Household labor 0.179∗
(0.0990)
Head of household is widow(er) -0.558
(0.509)
Wealth (poverty score) 0.0134
(0.00914)
Number of acres in 2006 0.0774
(0.0691)
Number of acres in 2006, squared -0.00377∗
(0.00207)
Grows/has grown traditional bananas 0.505∗
(0.262)
Number of crops grown in 2010 0.226∗∗∗
(0.0680)
No. banana growers within 0.5km 0.0361∗∗
(0.0179)
Subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects no yes
Observations 520 514
Notes: Logit coeﬃcient estimates, constant not reported. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at subvillage level in column (1). *
denotes signiﬁcance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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This is well in line with anthropologic ﬁeld work in the area which concludes that women
generally have the authority over bananas as compared to beans which is the domain of
men (Mogensen and Pedersen, forthcoming). There appears to be an inverse U-shaped
relationship between the propensity to adopt and the age of the farmer, though the two
terms are not jointly signiﬁcant at the ten percent level.29 Though the coeﬃcients are
not signiﬁcant, the pattern is well interpretable. Until the age of 45 there is an increas-
ing relationship between the farmer's age and adoption while the relationship is negative
for older farmers. This can be explained by the diﬀerent phases in a household where a
young farmer has to spend time on child rearing, while when the children become older
the household can draw on teenage labour force. For older farmers, the children may have
left home leaving fewer hands in the family farming activity.
Religion appears to play an important role showing that Catholics are much more likely
to adopt than Protestants who constitute the reference group. The correlation corresponds
in size to knowing an extra banana growing RIPAT farmer.30 The other religion dummies
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Whether the farmer participates in an NGO
project now or has done so in the past does not aﬀect adoption which is opposite to
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) who ﬁnds project participation to be an important determinant
of adoption.
With respect to household characteristics, it is somewhat surprising that education
does not appear to have a stronger eﬀect on the decision to adopt, here measured as
the highest number of years of schooling anyone has attained in the household.31 The
little importance of education suggests that the new technology is so simple that lack of
formal education is not a barrier to adoption. If I had been able to measure the exact
techniques applied, I may have been able to demonstrate the role of education in the
accuracy of the methods used. On the other hand, household labour appears to have
29Wald tests of joint signiﬁcance: χ2(2) = 2.48, p = 0.29.
30Catholics are equally represented among RIPAT and non-RIPAT farmer, so the large coeﬃcient can
not be explained by Catholics being reluctant to join RIPAT groups. The role of religion in networks
would be an interesting topic for future studies.
31As 58 percent of the sample has completed seven years of primary education, I could instead include
dummies for having more or less than seven years of education. However, these are not jointly signiﬁcant
either, nor is the education of the farmer included either as years or as dummies.
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some impact on adoption though it is only signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. It is
measured as the number of household members who are able to do hard manual labour to
a full extent. As the establishment of a banana plantation requires a lot of hard manual
labour it is intuitive that the available household labour is positively correlated with
adoption. Whether the household head is a widow(er) seems to be negatively correlated
with the adoption decision as expected. The estimated coeﬃcient is rather large, but quite
inaccurate and hence not statistically signiﬁcant. Naturally, a widow(er) household has
less available household labour, and the strong negative correlation between household
labour and the widow dummy explains the large standard errors. The wealth of the
household as measured by a poverty score does not appear to be a strong determinant of
adoption. Neither does the number of acres the household has access to seem to play a very
important role. It is included quadraticly and the two terms are only jointly signiﬁcant
at the ten percent level.32 Hence, little wealth or limited access to land does not seem to
be important barriers to adoption, supporting the trialability of banana cultivation and
further suggesting that network eﬀects are not driven by access to credit.
If the household has previously grown traditional bananas, they are more likely to
adopt which is intuitive as banana cultivation is exactly compatible with the livelihood
of these households. However, it should be noted that this impact only corresponds
to half the impact of knowing an extra banana growing RIPAT farmer which stresses
the importance of information networks. I include the number of crops the household
grew in 2010, net of traditional and improved bananas, to control for the combination
of entrepreneurship and preference for risk diversiﬁcation that would induce the farmer
to plant many diﬀerent crops. The number of crops grown in 2010 is indeed positively
correlated with the adoption of banana cultivation and signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Finally, I control for growing conditions such as soil quality and rainfall by including the
number of banana growers within a radius of 0.5 kilometres and the parameter is positive
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level.
Among the list of characteristics, the number of RIPAT banana growers in the net-
32Wald tests of joint signiﬁcance: χ2(2) = 5.06, p = 0.08. If number of acres is included linearly the
parameter is negative but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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work of the farmer prevails as one of the most important determinants of adoption both
economically and statistically. The t-statistic of the parameter estimate is 6.25, which is
by far the largest t-statistic of the included controls.33 With respect to the magnitude
of the parameter, the eﬀect of the RIPAT network appears to be rather dominant. For
instance, it corresponds to the impact of having more than ﬁve extra household members
who are able to do manual labour to full extent which is quite a large eﬀect taking into
account that establishment of a banana plantation requires a lot of labour.
It is noteworthy that the eﬀect of knowing an extra RIPAT banana grower is approx-
imately four times as high as the eﬀect of knowing a non-RIPAT banana grower. This
indicates that the diﬀusion of the improved banana cultivation is strongest from project
participants to farmers who discuss farming issues with them, but that the diﬀusion eases
oﬀ from the non-participants and onwards. This could be explained by several factors.
Firstly, it could be an indication that the learning eﬀects abate as we move further
away from project participants. The RIPAT farmers have been thoroughly trained and
are hence convincing teachers while non-RIPAT banana growers aﬀect their network to a
smaller extent because they are less experienced and trained than the RIPAT farmers.
Secondly, it takes approximately one year from the establishment of a banana plant
before the farmer can harvest seedlings that can be passed on to other farmers in the
network. Hence, if non-RIPAT banana growers have planted recently, they may not be
able to share seedlings in their network.
Thirdly, 61 percent of the RIPAT farmers who grow bananas and have passed on
seedlings to other farmers mention obligation in the project as one of the reasons for
passing on improved banana seedlings to other farmers. This fact raises the question of
whether the adopting farmers simply plant a few banana plants because they received the
seedlings as gifts which leads to the high impact of RIPAT network on adoption or whether
they really learn the new technology and adopt it because they perceive improved banana
cultivation to be advantageous. One way to shed light on this issue is to only consider
farmers who asked for the seedlings as opposed to the seedlings being given to them.34 The
33The second largest t-statistic is -3.44 for the parameter of network size.
34This can be identiﬁed from the following question in the questionnaire: Were the improved banana
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majority went and asked for the seedling (79 percent) and if only these adopting farmers
are included in the analysis, the parameter estimate for both the RIPAT and non-RIPAT
banana growers in network increases (see estimates in Appendix C). It is not entirely clear
whether the diﬀerential impact from RIPAT and non-RIPAT banana growers stems from
diﬀerential learning eﬀects, lag in seedling production or the obligation to share among
RIPAT farmers, but this result suggests that the diﬀusion of improved banana cultivation
is not purely driven by the obligation of RIPAT farmers to pass on seedlings to other
farmers.
6.2 Functional form
It is not given that network eﬀects are linear and hence, I present estimates for diﬀerent
functional forms of the network variables in Table 6.2. Farmer and household character-
istics are included and subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for in all speciﬁcations.
Column (1) gives the estimated logit coeﬃcients on the external margin: the eﬀect
of knowing one or more RIPAT or non-RIPAT banana growers on adoption, respectively.
The impact of knowing one or more RIPAT farmers is positive and signiﬁcant at the
one percent level and almost three times larger than the impact of knowing one or more
non-RIPAT banana growers. The latter is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ten
percent level.
Following Kremer and Miguel (2007), I include the share of RIPAT banana growers
and non-RIPAT banana growers in the network instead of the number of people in column
(2), still controlling for the network size. The proportion of RIPAT banana growers in
the network has a positive impact on the propensity to adopt which is signiﬁcant at the
one percent level. So has the proportion of non-RIPAT banana growers and even though
the coeﬃcient is less than two thirds of the coeﬃcient for the RIPAT proportion, a Wald
test of equality of the two coeﬃcients yields a p-value of 0.056.35 Thus, strictly I cannot
reject an equal impact of the share of RIPAT and non-RIPAT banana growers in network
seedlings given to you or did you go and ask for the seedlings?
35Wald test of equal coeﬃcients for RIPAT and non-RIPAT banana growers share in network: χ2(1) =
3.64, p = 0.056.
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Table 6.2: Adoption of improved banana cultivation, diﬀerent functional forms of net-
work variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
External margin Proportion Quadratic Splines
Know RIPAT banana grower(s), (0/1) 1.759∗∗∗
(0.271)
Know non-RIPAT banana grower(s), (0/1) 0.633∗
(0.354)
RIPAT banana grower network share 3.386∗∗∗
(0.468)
Non-RIPAT banana growers network share 2.031∗∗∗
(0.573)
RIPAT banana growers 1.733∗∗∗
(0.302)
RIPAT banana growers, squared -0.259∗∗∗
(0.0865)
Non-RIPAT banana growers 0.256
(0.209)
Non-RIPAT banana growers, squared -0.00245
(0.0104)
1-2 RIPAT banana growers 1.721∗∗∗
(0.292)
3+ RIPAT banana growers 2.344∗∗∗
(0.697)
1-2 non-RIPAT banana growers 0.548
(0.375)
3+ non-RIPAT banana growers 0.701
(0.903)
Network size -0.0988∗∗ -0.0420 -0.289∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0376) (0.0757)
Network size, squared 0.00564∗∗∗
(0.00213)
Network size: 1-2 0.108
(0.357)
Network size: 3+ -0.785∗∗
(0.395)
Observations 514 514 514 514
P-values from Wald tests of splines: 1-2 RIPAT = 3+ RIPAT 0.363
1-2 non-RIPAT = 3+ non-RIPAT 0.871
Network size: 1-2 = Network size: 3+ 0.002
Notes: Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates accounting for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
in parentheses. Farmer and household characteristics are included in all speciﬁcations. * denotes
signiﬁcance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
on the propensity to adopt at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level.
In column (3) I allow for a quadratic form of the three network variables. The marginal
impact of knowing an extra RIPAT banana grower is positive but decreasing until know-
ing three RIPAT farmers and hereafter the marginal impact of knowing an extra RIPAT
farmer is negative. This pattern is signiﬁcant at the one percent level and corresponds
to the inverse U-shape found in Bandiera and Rasul (2006). Nevertheless, I ﬁnd it im-
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portant to notice that only 1.4 percent of the farmers in my sample know more than
three RIPAT farmers and hence, it would verge on extrapolation to draw conclusion on
negative marginal eﬀects in networks with more than three RIPAT farmers. Bandiera and
Rasul (2006) conclude that the inverse U-shape they ﬁnd indicates existence of strategic
delay, but after all Bandiera and Rasul (2006) have 16 percent of their sample beyond
the peak of the estimated quadratic function. I conclude that the quadratic relationship I
ﬁnd suggest that the impact of knowing a RIPAT banana grower is larger on the external
than internal margin. The linear and squared term for non-RIPAT banana growers in
network are jointly insigniﬁcant,36 while the estimated coeﬃcients for the network size
reveal a U-shaped relationship with the minimum at 24 farmers in network. Only 0.8
percent of the sample has more than 24 farmers in the information network, so basically
the relationship between network size and adoption is negative but decreasing (in absolute
terms) given the number of banana growers in network.
To further investigate the non-linearity, I consider splines of the network variables:
Knowing one to two farmers or knowing three and more farmers, both with respect to
RIPAT, non-RIPAT banana growers and farmers in general (network size). I do not
ﬁnd support for negative marginal eﬀects in this speciﬁcation either as the parameter for
knowing three or more RIPAT farmers is not smaller than the parameter for knowing
one to two RIPAT farmers. However, as shown in the bottom of Table 6.2 I cannot
reject that the impact of knowing three or more is equal to the impact of knowing one
or two RIPAT farmers, which provides further support for decreasing marginal returns
to knowing an extra RIPAT banana grower. Similar to the quadratic speciﬁcation, the
estimated parameters for knowing non-RIPAT banana growers are jointly insigniﬁcant.37
Taken together, this further supports the result that knowing RIPAT banana growers is
more important than knowing non-RIPAT banana growers. With respect to network size,
knowing one to two farmers does not aﬀect the adoption decision, while knowing three or
more has a negative impact on adoption, ceteris paribus.
Results from the diﬀerent speciﬁcations seem to suggest decreasing marginal returns
36Wald test of joint signiﬁcance: χ2(2) = 3.43, p = 0.180.
37Wald test of joint signiﬁcance: χ2(2) = 2.53, p = 0.282.
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to knowing an extra RIPAT farmer. However, for simplicity I will keep the linear baseline
speciﬁcation in the following estimations.
6.3 Contextual eﬀects
I have found a strong relationship between banana growers in network and the adoption
decision, but the question is whether this correlation provides evidence for learning eﬀects
or is confounded by other factors. If characteristics such as the wealth of the network
members aﬀect the adoption decision then a correlation in adoption behaviour within
networks may be confounded by access to informal credit. If I had detailed data on all
network members, I could control for average characteristics in the network, but as I only
have detailed information on the RIPAT farmers in the network, I proceed diﬀerently. I
split the RIPAT farmers in the network based on four central socioeconomic characteris-
tics: wealth, education, gender, and age, and I examine whether the network eﬀects diﬀer
dependent on the characteristics of the network members. No diﬀerential eﬀects would
support the hypothesis that the network eﬀects found are not driven by contextual eﬀects.
I measure wealth by a poverty score with a range of 0-100 (Schreiner, 2011) and
split the sample of RIPAT farmers in networks at the mean poverty score, 47.4.38 With
respect to education, RIPAT farmers are divided into three groups: less than seven years
of education (26.9 percent), seven years of education (68.1 percent) and more than seven
years of education (5.0 percent of the sample). The gender split is self-explanatory, while
the sample is split into young and old farmers at the mean age of 46.9 years.39
Table 6.3 shows the estimation results together with tests of equal network eﬀects
across diﬀerent characteristics of network members. Column (1) does not provide support
for the hypothesis that the network eﬀect is driven by access to credit as the estimated
eﬀect of knowing rich RIPAT banana growers is in fact lower than knowing poor RIPAT
banana growers. However, this diﬀerence is very far from being signiﬁcant.
Turning to the split on farmers' education in column (2), it appears that there is a
38The median poverty score among the RIPAT farmers in networks is 46.3, and results are robust to
splitting the sample at the median.
39The median age is 45 which is close to the mean age, and the results are robust to splitting the
sample at the median.
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Table 6.3: Adoption of improved banana cultivation, split on characteristics of RIPAT
network
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealth Education Gender Age
Poor RIPAT banana growers 1.047∗∗∗
(0.246)
Rich RIPAT banana growers 0.950∗∗∗
(0.237)
RIPAT banana growers with low edu. 0.587
(0.364)
RIPAT banana growers with medium edu. 1.164∗∗∗
(0.216)
RIPAT banana growers with high edu. 1.009
(0.727)
Male RIPAT banana growers 1.058∗∗∗
(0.204)
Female RIPAT banana growers 0.829∗∗
(0.330)
Young RIPAT banana growers 1.039∗∗∗
(0.255)
Old RIPAT banana growers 1.001∗∗∗
(0.260)
Non-RIPAT banana growers in network 0.257∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.1000) (0.1000) (0.0989) (0.0997)
Network size -0.191∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.0575) (0.0579) (0.0576) (0.0574)
Observations 514 514 514 514
Wald tests of equal eﬀects:a χ2, (p-value) 0.09 1.95 0.36 0.01
(0.770) (0.377) (0.550) (0.921)
Notes: Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates accounting for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
in parentheses. Farmer and household characteristics are included in all speciﬁcations. * denotes
signiﬁcance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
a The following is tested: Column (1): Poor = rich (df = 1), Column (2): Low edu. = medium edu.
= high edu. (df = 2), Column (3): Male = female (df = 1), Column (4): Young = old (df = 1).
smaller eﬀect from knowing RIPAT banana growers with less than seven years of edu-
cation, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence on the three estimated network eﬀects for
diﬀerent education categories. The coeﬃcient for knowing RIPAT farmers with a high
education is imprecisely estimated as the group is fairly small.40 To ensure that the ac-
ceptance of the null hypothesis is not driven by large standard errors induced by the
high education category, I combine the high and medium education category, and again I
accept the null of no diﬀerence in network eﬀects across education of network members.41
40Only 13 farmers in the sample know a RIPAT farmer with high education.
41Estimation results not reported. Wald test of equal eﬀects for knowing RIPAT farmers with low and
medium/high education: χ2(1) = 1.00, p = 0.318.
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As can be seen in column (3), the impact of knowing a male RIPAT farmer seems
to be larger than knowing a female RIPAT farmer. Nevertheless I again reject that the
network eﬀects are diﬀerential across gender. Neither do the estimates and test results in
column (4) provide evidence for a diﬀerence in the network eﬀects across age.
Hence, I conclude that the network eﬀects appear to be rather homogenous across these
four socioeconomic characteristics which indicates that the network eﬀects are not driven
by contextual eﬀects. At least, the network eﬀects do not seem to be driven by access to
informal credit or e.g. by knowing older RIPAT farmers who are maybe more respected
and inﬂuential in the village. I will address the potential presence of unobserved factors
such as the degree of inﬂuence in the network that could aﬀect the estimated network
eﬀects in the placebo study in section 7.
6.4 Robustness
In Table 6.4 I present diﬀerent robustness tests of the baseline speciﬁcation presented in
column (3) of Table 6.1. Column (1) includes a range of extra covariates: farmers' liter-
acy and numeracy skills, ownership of mobile phone, use of irrigation channel, historical
rainfall and distance to the nearest river or stream. Consequently 12 observations are
dropped due to missing values mainly on GPS measures used for determining historical
rainfall and distance to nearest waterway. The coeﬃcient for the network variables are
all within one standard error of the estimates from the baseline model and a test of joint
exclusion of the extra covariates is accepted with a p-value of 0.711.42
In column (2) farmers with no people in network or with 20 or more network members
are excluded from the sample. Only ﬁve farmers discuss farming issues with 20 or more
farmers, but 119 farmers (22.9 percent of the sample) do not discuss farming issues with
anyone. Figure 4.1 suggested that a larger fraction of non-adopting farmers actually had
no information network. To see if the results are driven by unconnected non-adopters I
hence also exclude farmers with no information network. The estimate for the number of
RIPAT banana growers in network is virtually the same and still signiﬁcant at the one
42Wald test of joint signiﬁcance of extra covariates: χ2(6) = 3.75, p = 0.711.
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Table 6.4: Adoption of improved banana cultivation, robustness of results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extra Excl. Important Income Early Late
covariates outliers crops source adopters adopters
RIPAT banana growers 1.048∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.189) (0.230) (0.177) (0.310) (0.185)
Non-RIPAT banana growers 0.242∗∗ 0.200 0.164 0.248∗∗ 0.397 0.227∗∗
(0.103) (0.183) (0.117) (0.102) (0.328) (0.0993)
Network size -0.197∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.120∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.0595) (0.0767) (0.0693) (0.0592) (0.165) (0.0595)
Farmer can read 0.360
(0.401)
Farmer is good at math 0.109
(0.275)
Owns mobile phone -0.0607
(0.286)
Use irrigation channel -0.573
(0.523)
Average yearly rainfall in mm -0.0123
(0.00860)
Dist. to nearest waterway, km 0.234
(0.322)
Grows improved maize, 2009 0.0480
(0.415)
Grows traditional maize, 2009 0.0567
(0.404)
Grows beans, 2009 0.616
(0.490)
Grows vegetables, 2009 -0.303
(0.395)
Other income source -0.315
(0.325)
Observations 502 391 327 498 263 469
Notes: Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates accounting for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in
parentheses. Farmer and household characteristics are included in all speciﬁcations. In column (2) farmers
with no people in network or with 20 or more network members are excluded from the sample. * denotes
signiﬁcance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
percent level. With respect to non-RIPAT banana growers, the eﬀect is still within one
standard error of the baseline result, however no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The negative relationship between adoption and network size is increased in magnitude
which is not surprising as the farmers with no information network were mainly non-
adopters.
A concern could be that the formation of information networks is aﬀected by previously
grown crops which would also be correlated with the adoption of banana cultivation if
the proﬁtability of bananas only dominates certain crops. In the baseline speciﬁcation
I control for previous cultivation of traditional banana, but to further investigate this I
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control for the four most dominating crops grown in 2009. As these crops are annual
crops they would be planted in the rainy season in the second quarter of 2009 and hence,
I restrict my sample of adopting farmers to those who adopted later than June 2009.
If all farmers who grew traditional maize were connected and also converted to banana
cultivation because bananas were more proﬁtable than traditional maize, then the dummy
for traditional maize cultivation would take the explanatory power away from the number
of banana growers in the network. Results presented in column (3) of Table 6.4 do
not support this story. The parameter for the RIPAT network is still signiﬁcant at the
one percent level and not more than one standard error lower than the result from the
baseline speciﬁcation. The dummy variables for cultivation of improved and traditional
maize, beans and vegetables are jointly insigniﬁcant with a p-value of 0.697.43 Hence, the
results suggest that the network eﬀects found are not driven by network formation based
on previously grown crops.
In column (4) I study the puzzling result of a negative impact of the size of the
information network conditional on the number of banana growers in the network. An
explanation could be that farmers with large networks are mainly preoccupied with other
activities than farming, such as transport or petty trade, which implies many contacts in
the local community and less time for laborious farming activities. I hence include a binary
variable taking the value one if the most important income source in the household is not
agriculture or livestock keeping (i.e. the most important income source is either petty
trade, transport, casual or wage labour, transfers or other income generating activities).
As expected, this variable is negatively associated with adoption but the estimates of the
network variables are unchanged.
Finally, I investigate whether the self-selection mechanism into RIPAT could be driv-
ing the network eﬀects. A farmer who is initially interested in the new banana cultivation
could choose not to participate in RIPAT if she knew several people who signed up for
the project and who could give her seedlings and teach her the planting techniques. As
participation in a RIPAT group requires time consuming tasks such as cultivation of the
43Wald test of joint signiﬁcance: χ2(4) = 2.21, p = 0.697.
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common plot and participation in weekly meetings, this strategy could be optimal for
farmers who face constraints on time or household labour. It has the ﬂavour of the strate-
gic delay found in the 'target input' model where farmers would delay adoption if they
know enough adopters in order to avoid costly experimentation. Obviously, self-selection
out of RIPAT and subsequent adoption through the information network would also con-
stitute a social learning eﬀect, but from a policy perspective this eﬀect is of a smaller
interest than the case where the perceived proﬁtability of new technologies disseminates
through information networks. This is the case because if the network eﬀects found are
purely driven by self-selection out of RIPAT then the crux of the matter would be to
convince the farmers of the proﬁtability of a new technology at the initial village meeting.
The interesting case is when social learning eﬀects work through aﬀecting the perceived
proﬁtability of the technology in networks. A smaller group of farmers experiment with
a new technology and their experiences will subsequently aﬀect the perception in the
local community of the relative proﬁtability of the applied technology through their in-
formation networks. In this case, projects could simply target well-connected individuals
in local communities. Through experimentation in the local circumstances, they would
form a perception of the proﬁtability of the new technology. This perception would then
disseminate in their large networks increasing the reach of the project.
Thus, I ﬁnd it important to distinguish the two diﬀerent channels. I do this by
splitting the sample of adopting farmers on early and late adopters, where early adopters
planted their ﬁrst improved bananas in 2006 or 2007. Within these two years RIPAT
farmers would have time to plant bananas on their own farm and the plants would grow
suﬃciently to produce seedlings that can be shared in the network. I assume that the
type of farmers who self-select out of RIPAT because they have network members in a
RIPAT group would adopt as soon as possible and hence they would fall in the category
of early adopters. If they do believe initially that banana cultivation is more proﬁtably
than other crops they grow, the optimal strategy would be to adopt as soon as possible.
Column (5)-(6) in Table 6.4 presents the results for early and late adopters, respectively.
There is indeed a larger parameter estimate for the RIPAT network eﬀect among the
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early adopters providing support of this special type of strategic delay. Nevertheless, the
estimate for late adopters is less than a standard error smaller than the baseline result
and still signiﬁcant at the one percent level. So even though some of the learning eﬀects
found in this paper may be explained by self-selection out of RIPAT groups, it appears
that social learning also takes place through the perception of the relative proﬁtability of
banana cultivation.
7 Placebo study results
Is the strong correlation between RIPAT farmers in network and adoption behaviour
simply driven by correlation in farmer speciﬁc characteristics within networks? If two en-
trepreneurial farmers discuss farming issues with each other, a correlation in their adoption
behaviour may be due to the fact that they are both willing to experiment rather than
social learning taking place. I address this question by considering the adoption of other
cash crops and how that depends on the number of RIPAT farmers in the network. Table
7.1 presents the estimates from logistic regressions of adoption of vegetables, sunﬂowers
and sugarcanes, respectively.
A positive correlation between the number of RIPAT banana growers in network and
adoption of vegetables could indicate that unobserved farmer characteristics were corre-
lated, but if the RIPAT banana growers in the network also grew vegetables a positive
correlation would occur in the case of social learning within vegetables production. Hence,
I control for the number of RIPAT banana growers in network who also grow the placebo
crop. Since only 13 percent of the farmers grow sunﬂowers and eight percent grow sug-
arcane there are several subvillages with no variation in the adoption of the placebo crop
which results in a fewer number of observations.
The results in Table 7.1 show that the number of banana growers in network cannot
explain adoption of any of the three placebo crops. The lower number of observations in
particular in column (2) and (3) raises the question of whether the models have any power
to explain the variation in adoption of sunﬂower and sugarcane. If the eﬀects of network
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Table 7.1: Placebo study results, adoption of vegetables, sunﬂower and sugar-
cane
(1) (2) (3)
Vegetables Sunﬂower Sugarcane
RIPAT banana growers in network 0.313 0.213 -0.0552
(0.256) (0.203) (0.248)
Non-RIPAT banana growers in network 0.114 -0.00148 0.0317
(0.185) (0.157) (0.185)
Network size 0.0494 0.0295 -0.0621
(0.0342) (0.0741) (0.0994)
RIPAT growing vegetables -0.276
(0.343)
RIPAT growing sunﬂowers 0.241
(0.578)
RIPAT growing sugarcanes 0.747
(0.914)
Observations 498 340 310
Adjusted pseudo R2 a 0.116 0.102 0.081
Notes: Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates accounting for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Farmer and household characteristics are included in
all speciﬁcations, but in column (2) religion dummies are excluded as Catholic dummy
predicts non-adoption perfectly leading to drop of 43 observations. Results are robust
to inclusion of religion dummies. The number of crops grown in 2010 is subtracted
traditional and improved bananas and the placebo crop. Due to lack of variation in
adoption within some subvillages, the number of observations is lower than 520.
a Adjusted pseudo R2 is calculated as 1− (logLm−K)/logL0 where logLm refers to the log
likelihood of the speciﬁed model with K variables, and logL0 is the log likelihood of a
model with only a constant.
variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero simply due to large standard errors
caused by smaller sample sizes then the placebo test has no bite. Exploiting variation
across subvillages in order to keep more observations in the sample would not resolve the
issue: if bananas and vegetables require the same growing conditions adoption will be
correlated within subvillages and if farmers discuss farming issues with their neighbours,
then the correlation between RIPAT banana growers in network and adoption of vegetables
would not give evidence of correlated farmer speciﬁc characteristics. Instead, I start out by
regarding the estimated logit coeﬃcients. To make an exact comparison with the baseline
results would require calculation of marginal eﬀects which is not feasible. Nevertheless,
I note that the estimated parameter for RIPAT banana growers in network is negative
with respect to adoption of sugarcanes and that it is three to ﬁve times smaller than the
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baseline estimate for vegetable and sunﬂower adoption, respectively. Standard errors are
less than 1.5 times larger in the baseline regression. This suggests that the insigniﬁcance
of the parameters is not purely driven by an increase in the standard errors. Accordingly,
the parameters for non-RIPAT banana growers in network are also less than half of the
baseline estimate while standard errors are 1.8 times larger.
To give an imprecision of the explanatory power of the models, I have included the
adjusted pseudo R-squared in Table 7.1.44 For comparison, the adjusted pseudo R-squared
of the baseline model is 0.156. As the placebo regressions have R-squares of 0.081-0.116,
they do not appear to explain much less than the baseline model.45
Even though none of the network variables have any explanatory power, some of the
other covariates are signiﬁcantly correlated with adoption of the placebo crops (results
not reported). In particular the number of crops grown in 2010, net of banana cultivation
and the given placebo crop, is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with the adoption
of all three placebo crops. The same was the case for adoption of banana cultivation
suggesting that this variable captures the entrepreneurial spirit of the farmer or the will-
ingness to experiment. Indeed, if I exclude the number of crops grown in 2010 from the
placebo regressions, the parameter for banana growers in network is signiﬁcant at a ten
percent level for the adoption of vegetables. Hence, there may be some correlation in
farmer characteristics such as the willingness to experiment, but this is to a large degree
captured in the number of crops grown in 2010.
This placebo study further supports the existence of social learning since it does not
provide support for a potential correlation in unobserved farmer characteristics within
networks as the main driver of the network eﬀects found.
44It should be noted that the pseudo R-squared can not be interpreted as the share of the variation
of the outcome variable explained by the model. However, it can give an indication of the explanatory
power of the model.
45As I do not include the number of adopters of the placebo crops in the placebo regressions, it could
be interesting to compare the adjusted pseudo R-squared to that of the baseline model excluding the two
variables capturing banana growers in network. That yields an adjusted pseudo R-squared of 0.069 which
is even lower than the R-squared of the placebo regressions.
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8 Conclusion and discussion
This empirical paper studies the role of information networks in the diﬀusion of improved
banana cultivation in northern rural Tanzania. The new cultivation technique was in-
troduced by an agricultural project, and the results show that discussing farming issues
with banana growing farmers who participate in the project increases the likelihood of
adopting improved banana cultivation. Furthermore, discussing farming issues with other
banana growers also seems to have an impact on adoption, though this eﬀect is weaker
and less robust.
It is diﬃcult to identify social interaction eﬀects in the absence of experimental vari-
ation in the data. The issue is treated rigorously in section 5 of the paper. A test is
suggested for the potential reverse causality from the ex ante perceived proﬁtability of
banana cultivation to network formation. Results indicate no presence of reverse causality
in the data. Whether the network eﬀects found are driven by contextual eﬀects (such as
the wealth of network members) is investigated by splitting the project participants in net-
works by diﬀerent socioeconomic characteristics. The network eﬀects do not appear to be
heterogeneous across the characteristics of the project farmers in the network suggesting
that the results are not driven by contextual eﬀects. Confounding factors such as growing
conditions and institutions are accounted for by including the number of banana growers
within half a kilometre and by only considering variation within subvillages. Finally, the
potential role of unobserved farmer-speciﬁc characteristics is examined through a placebo
study. The network eﬀects found may be upward biased if entrepreneurial farmers know
more banana growers but also are more likely to adopt banana cultivation regardless of
their network. If the number of banana growers in network proxies for the entrepreneurial
skills of the farmer, it should also be positively correlated with the adoption of other
lucrative cash crops. I examine the adoption of vegetable, sunﬂower and sugarcane pro-
duction, but do not ﬁnd the network variables to have any explanatory power in these
regressions. Hence, I conclude that unobserved characteristics do not seem to drive the
network eﬀects found within banana cultivation.
Generally, I ﬁnd that the impact of discussing farming issues with project participants
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on adoption of banana cultivation is large and the network eﬀect is very robust across
speciﬁcations. Furthermore, none of the identiﬁcation tests are in disfavour of the presence
of endogenous social interaction eﬀects. Though I cannot perfectly rule out all issues of
identiﬁcation, the analysis clearly points to the existence of social learning in the context
under study.
This ﬁnding adds to the thin empirical literature on social learning within adoption
of agricultural technologies in developing countries. It conﬁrms the importance of so-
cial networks as concluded by Conley and Udry (2010) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006).
Furthermore, I contribute to the literature on adoption of technology by studying the
diﬀusion of technology beyond project participants of an agricultural project. To my
knowledge, this has not been done before. It is important for policy implications to study
this kind of second generation take-up because it can provide advice on whom to target for
agricultural projects in order to obtain the largest possible impact. The results presented
in this paper suggest that targeting well-connected farmers will increase the impact of a
similar future project through diﬀusion of technology in the local community.
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) ﬁnd that the adoption of sunﬂower cultivation has an
inverse U-shaped relationship to the number of adopters in the network. They argue
that the negative marginal eﬀect of knowing an extra adopter when the farmer knows
ten or more adopters can be interpreted as evidence of strategic delay. If information
is shared in the network then knowing many adopters allows the farmer to free-ride on
their experimentation and hence induces her to delay her decision to adopt and avoid
the costly experimentation. I also ﬁnd an indication of an inverse U-shaped relationship
between adoption of banana cultivation and project banana growers in network with
a peak of three adopters in network. However, 99 percent of my sample knows three
or fewer project participants who grow improved bananas. Hence, this result does not
allow me to conclude that farmers are strategically delaying their adoption decision. But
since participation in the project under study was voluntary that allows me to revise
the strategic delay found in Bandiera and Rasul (2006), though in another dimension.
A farmer knowing several other farmers who signed up for the project may deliberately
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have chosen not to sign up in expectation of future social learning eﬀects. Such a farmer
would then receive improved banana seedlings and advice from participating farmers as
soon as they had learned the new technique. This strategy could be optimal for a farmer
who has a high opportunity cost of labour because project participation required presence
at weekly meetings and cultivation of a common plot. Since this type of strategic delay
would imply adoption of improved banana cultivation within two years after project start,
I study if there are diﬀerential network eﬀects for early and late adopters. I do indeed
ﬁnd that network eﬀects are stronger for early adopters suggesting the presence of this
special type of strategic delay, but the strong average network eﬀect found among all
adopters persist among the late adopters. The latter indicates that the network eﬀects
cannot be fully explained by self-selection out of the project for well-connected farmers,
which is important for policy implications. Though farmers exerting strategic delay do
indeed rely on social learning, this type of social learning does not indicate that a newly
introduced technology would diﬀuse in the surrounding community. On the other hand,
an interpretation of the network eﬀect for the late adopters is that experimentation among
their network members have aﬀected their perception of the relative proﬁtability of the
new technology and thereby induced them to adopt it. This kind of social learning
results in a multiplier eﬀect of an agricultural project that succeeds in introducing a
new technology which is more proﬁtable than existing technologies and at the same time
compatible with local norms and circumstances.
The results in the paper reveal a larger and more robust eﬀect of knowing banana
growing project participants than of knowing other banana growers. This can be inter-
preted in diﬀerent ways. It could be an indication that the learning eﬀects subside as we
move further away from project participants. This implies that the multiplier eﬀect of
the project is limited to the network of project participants and we should only expect a
small degree of diﬀusion from adopting non-participants and further on in their networks.
On the other hand, the smaller eﬀect of banana growing non-participants in the network
may be a pure product of timing: Everything else equal, I expect banana growers who
are not part of the project to have planted later than project participants. Hence, they
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may not yet have harvested their ﬁrst banana bunch and hence, their network members
may not be able to deduce the proﬁtability of banana cultivation yet. In this case, the
diﬀerential network eﬀects do not contradict that the diﬀusion of knowledge continues be-
yond the second generation take-up. Finally, the speciﬁc design of the project pertaining
the diﬀusion of technology may play a role. Participating farmers were obliged to pass
on banana seedlings thrice which may explain why knowing a project participant has a
stronger impact on adoption than knowing another banana grower. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd
that network eﬀects persist if I limit my sample of adopting farmers to those who actively
asked for banana seedlings. This suggests that the network eﬀects are not purely driven
by project design.
Whether the social learning eﬀects found in this paper will persist and cause improved
banana cultivation to further diﬀuse in the community remains an open question.
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A Appendix - Data collection
The data collection took place in January 2011, were 2,639 households were interviewed
in total. The survey was funded by the Rockwool Foundation, designed by a Rockwool
Foundation Research Team comprising Helene Bie Lilleør (HBL), Head of Evaluation, and
I, administered by RECODA (the NGO that also implemented RIPAT) and supervised
by Economic Development Initiative (EDI), which is a Tanzanian survey and consultancy
house. The main purpose of the data collection was to perform an impact evaluation
of RIPAT, and for this purpose all RIPAT households were interviewed together with
a corresponding number of control households from other villages. In addition, non-
participating households in RIPAT villages were interviewed for the purpose of studying
the dissemination of banana cultivation. First, I will describe the composition of the
sample comprising randomization and stratiﬁcation issues and then follows a description
of the development of survey instruments and the implementation of the data collection.
Table A.1: Sample of households
RIPAT 1 RIPAT 3
RIPAT 506 564
Control 490 482
Adopting 224 -
Non-adopting 373 -
Total 1,593 1,046
Sample composition
The survey covered four diﬀerent types of households: RIPAT households, control house-
holds in control villages, and two types of non-RIPAT households in RIPAT villages,
namely adopting and non-adopting households that were categorized depending on whether
or not they grew bananas. The number of households interviewed is presented in Table
A.1. The ﬁrst two groups of households where interviewed in order to perform the im-
pact evaluation. RIPAT and control households were interviewed both from the Arumeru
District where RIPAT1 took place but also in Karatu District where RIPAT3 took place.
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Figure A.1: Sample composition
Note: Number of observations per village in parentheses
Data collection in RIPAT2 was abolished because of cultural diﬃculties in collecting quan-
titative data among the Masai people. Adopting and non-adopting households were only
interviewed in RIPAT1 villages as the dissemination of banana cultivation was still very
sparse in the RIPAT3 villages at the time of the data collection preparations. An overview
of the sample composition is depicted in Figure A.1.
RIPAT households
Based on initial enrollment list and visits to RIPAT groups, every farmer who had ever
been a member of a RIPAT group was identiﬁed and included in the survey sample.
Almost all (95.1 percent) of the RIPAT households completed an interview.
Adopting and non-adopting households
In RIPAT villages, non-RIPAT households were sampled mainly for the purpose of this
study. RECODA staﬀ collected village lists from all eight RIPAT villages consisting
of a complete list of all households in the village. RIPAT households were identiﬁed
from the list, and 100 non-RIPAT households were selected at random from each village.
Randomization was implemented by numbering the households on the village lists and let
Excel draw random numbers among the number of households in the village. RECODA
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Figure A.2: Sample selection
had a list of households who had received banana seedlings from RIPAT farmers and these
households were identiﬁed from the village lists and added to the random sample if they
were not already listed. For this random sample and additional adopting households,
RECODA staﬀ collected information from the local leadership on whether the household
was farming and whether the household grew improved bananas. This was done to avoid
non-farming households in the sample and to conﬁrm whether a household was adopting
or not. On the basis of this information, I stratiﬁed the sample to obtain an even number
of adopting and non-adopting households. This was done in order to ensure that the ﬁnal
sample would include enough adopting households which are the households of interest
for this study. Had I simply drawn a random sample, some of the villages would only
have one or two adopting households in the sample which would impede the analysis of
the adoption decision. In that case, single observations would be pivotal for the outcome
of the analysis which is undiserable. Figure A.2 shows a chart of the sample selection
procedure for the adopting and non-adopting households.
The degree of adoption varied considerably across villages, so I decided not to have
the same sample size of non-adopting households in each village. The budget covered in-
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Table A.2: Sample of non-RIPAT households
Adopting households Non-adopting households
Village Identiﬁed Target Sample Sample
Kwaugoro 94 79 80 89
Karangai 33 27 20 37
Kikwe 15 15 7 19
Maweni 27 23 22 24
Majimoto 63 53 28 70
Mungushi 15 15 3 32
Manyata 41 34 14 50
Marurani 65 54 50 52
Total 353 300 224 373
terviews of 600 non-RIPAT households implying a target of 300 interviews with adopting
households. From the information of the local leaders I listed the number of adopting
households identiﬁed in a given village as can be seen in the ﬁrst column of Table A.2 and
calculated their share out of the total number of identiﬁed adopting households. I then
let the sample of households in this village constitute the same share out of the sample
of non-RIPAT households. E.g. 94 adopting households were identiﬁed in Kwaugoro out
of 353 in total, that is 26.6 pct. So 26.6 pct of the target sample of 300 adopting house-
holds should come from Kwaugoro, corresponding to a target of 80 adopting households.
However, HBL and I decided on a minimum of 30 households in each village (15 adopting
households) as we also wanted to exploit the information on non-RIPAT farmers for the
impact evaluation, and for that purpose the sample of non-RIPAT farmers in each village
should not be too small. This implied that the target samples in two villages (Kikwe and
Mungushi) were adjusted upwards and the samples in the remaining villages were adjusted
downwards accordingly. The target samples are presented in column two of Table A.2.
During the data collection, several issues made the ﬁnal sample deviate from the tar-
get. One important explanation is that 73 households showed up to be non-adopting
although the village leadership and RECODA records had stated otherwise and only 48
expected non-adopting households turned out to be adopting. This explains a diﬀerence
of 50 households between the samples of adopting and non-adopting households. In addi-
tion, unavailable adopting households were supposed to be replaced by another adopting
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household to the extent possible. But in two villages (Karangai and Mungushi) no more
adopting farmers could be identiﬁed, so unavailable adopting households were instead
replaced by non-adopting households. This further explains a diﬀerence of 38 households
between the two categories. Also, village leaders were not able to categorise 45 house-
holds a priori (21 of these were in Manyata) which hampered targeting of households.
Furthermore, the replacement rules were not abided in the case of Majimoto and several
non-adopting households were interviewed instead of targeted adopting households.
Control households
We chose control villages with the help of the District Oﬃces in Arumeru and Karatu
District. They appointed 10 and 12 villages, respectively, that were similar to RIPAT
villages with respect to a range of characteristics, in particular size, agroclimatic zone,
water supply, main religion and ethnicity, schools and health facilities, and distance to
nearest road and market. From the chosen control villages RECODA staﬀ collected village
lists which consisted of a complete list of all households in the village. Based on power
calculations and budget restrictions, HBL and I decided to have 480 control households
in each district implying 48 control households in each control village in Arumeru district
and 40 control households in each control village in Karatu District.
I stratiﬁed the sample of control households by subvillage since RIPAT households
were purposely chosen from all subvillages in the RIPAT villages. To ensure that all
subvillages where represented according to size, I calculated the share of households in a
subvillage out of the total number of households in the village and let the subvillage have
the same share in the random sample.
Female headed households were overrepresented in the RIPAT groups as a result of
the policy to have at least 50 percent female farmers in the groups. It was noted on the
initial village lists whether a household was female headed so that information was used
to stratify the ﬁnal random sample of control households such that they had the same
share of female headed households as the RIPAT groups.
RIPAT households where restricted to be farming households, to have at least one acre
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and not more than ﬁve acres of land. Since the upper limit was not followed very strictly,
we chose to expand the upper limit to eight acres of land. To ensure that the control
farmers would be comparable to RIPAT farmers, an initial random stratiﬁed sample of
100 households was drawn for which RECODA staﬀ gathered information from the local
leadership on whether the listed households were farming and had acres within the range.
Based on this information some households were dropped from the sample. Furthermore,
the ﬁrst questions in the questionnaire referred to whether the household is engaged in
farming activites and the number of acres they have, and if a control household did
not fulﬁl the criteria it was replaced. In addition, the questionnaire included a brief
presentation of an NGO project similar to RIPAT asking if the farmer would want to
participate if possible. If the farmer answered no, the household was also replaced.
Development of survey instruments
The survey consisted of three questionnaires: a household questionnaires, a village ques-
tionnaire and RIPAT group questionnaire.
I designed the household questionnaire such that it could be administered to all four
types of households with an elaborate skip pattern allowing some sections to be admin-
istered only to one type of households. The questionnaire included the sections listed in
Table A.3.
Sections C, F, H, K and O are inspired by questionnaires from the Living Standard
Measurement Surveys (Glewwe and Grosh, 2000). Section A and L are adapted from the
household questionnaire of the Karonga Assessment of Vulnerability in Malawi, conducted
by the RFF in 2010. Numeracy questions in section F and the risk game in section G are
taken from a survey on sexual and reproductive health in Uganda completed by Innova-
tions for Poverty Action, kindly made available by Julian Jamison, Federal Reserve, Bank
of Boston. Section I and M are copied from the Household Budget Survey 2006/07 con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, in order to enable the construction
of a poverty score card developed from the 2006/07 survey. The last part of section N
is developed by US Aid to measure household hunger (Deitchler, Ballard, Swindale, and
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Table A.3: Sections of household questionnaire
Section Content
Section A Administrative data and GPS measures of the household dwelling
Section B Identifying type of household and main respondent
Section C Crop cultivation and land holdings
Section D Banana cultivation (RIPAT and adopting farmers only)
Section E Information network (adopting and non-adopting farmers only)
Section F Farmer characteristics: religion, ethnicity and numeracy
Section G Risk game
Section H Shocks and participation in other projects
Section I Household assets
Section J Livestock
Section K Household roster: age, education, marital status and health
Section L Income sources
Section M Household facilities: quality and remoteness of housing
Section N Food security
Section O Measurement of children below six years
Coates, 2011). Finally, I have developed section B, D, E, J and the ﬁrst part of section
N for the purpose of this survey, where information network questions in section E are
inspired by network measures used in Conley and Udry (2010) and Bandiera and Rasul
(2006).
The household questionnaire can be divided into three parts: section C-G where the
preferred respondent is the farmer, section H-L where the preferred respondent is either
the farmer or the adult female in the household, and section M-O where the preferred
respondent is the adult female. The preferred respondents are chosen this way to get
the most reliable information both on farming activities and household facilities and food
security. The farmer is identiﬁed in section B as either the member of the RIPAT group
in RIPAT households; the farmer who decided to grow improved bananas in adopting
households; or the person who has taken most decisions for farming activities in non-
adopting households in RIPAT villages and control households in control villages. This
manner of identifying the main respondent was chosen because this allowed us to collect
personal information on the decision maker of interest.
The village questionnaire is highly inspired by the village questionnaire from the
Karonga Assessment of Vulnerability in Malawi, adapted to local circumstances and the
purposes of the data collection. It was administered as a group interview with the Village
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Executive Oﬃcer, the Village Chairperson and the Village Agricultural Extension Oﬃ-
cer or a knowledgeable farmer from the village if the extension oﬃcer was not available.
The virtue of a group interview with several key informants is that they can discuss and
conﬁrm the answers and hence, we elicit the most precise and trustworthy information.
The RIPAT group questionnaire was developed for the purpose of this survey and
administered to two persons out of the group triumvirate: the leader, secretary and
accountant, immediately after a household interview with one of them.
Implementation of the data collection
The survey team
The data collection was funded by the Rockwool Foundation and led by HBL and I,
with assistance from Maria Fibæk, an economics master student at the University of
Copenhagen. It was implemented in collaboration with RECODA, the implementing
organization of RIPAT, who identiﬁed six supervisors out of which four were permanent
RECODA staﬀ. One of the permanent RECODA staﬀers was chosen to supervise the
data entry process, while two others were in an advanced state of pregnancy and hence
unable to do extensive ﬁeld work. As ﬁve ﬁeld supervisors were needed, an external
supervisor was hired together with an additional supervisor among the applicants for the
enumerator jobs. This implies that only one in ﬁve ﬁeld supervisors was a RECODA
staﬀer. We hired 25 enumerators to enter in teams of ﬁve with one supervisor per team.
In the hiring process we emphasised that enumerators should not be associated with
RECODA in order to avoid that a RIPAT associated enumerator would aﬀect RIPAT
farmers to respond more positively to subjective questions (also known as the Hawthorne
eﬀect). Initially, we wanted to hire a local survey manager to administer the survey,
but the person we had found for the job bailed out in the last minute, and instead we
engaged a survey expert and a ﬁeld manager from EDI. In addition, the vice president of
RECODA was responsible for practical matters with respect to the data collection such
as transport, lunch and printing of questionnaires among many other things.
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Preparations for the data collection
Prior to data collection, the supervisors collected village lists, then stratiﬁcation and ran-
domisation took place, and the supervisors gathered additional information from the local
village leaderships on the sample of households as described under Sample composition.
All three questionnaires were pilot-tested by the supervisors guided by Maria Fibæk and
I. In particular the household questionnaire was subject to extensive pilot-testing of all
parts of the questionnaire to ensure that response categories were adequate, that ques-
tions were easy to understand and induced consise responses. During pilot-testing, Maria
and I trained supervisors in interview techniques, checking questionnaires and organising
ﬁeld work. All questionnaires were translated into Swahili by the group of supervisors
and translation was discussed among them and with us to ensure the correct intention of
the question. Even during training of enumerators and the ﬁrst week of the actual data
collection minor adjustments of the questionnaires were made based on experiences from
enumerators and supervisors.
The survey expert and the ﬁeld manager from EDI, together with Maria Fibæk, were
responsible for the training of the enumerators comprising class room presentation of the
questionnaires and training in interview techniques, combined with pretesting of ques-
tionnaires in villages that were not part of the sample.
The data collection
The actual data collection took place from January 3rd to February 4th, 2011. It was
implemented by the team of supervisors and enumerators, organised by the ﬁeld manager
and supervised by the survey expert who was in the ﬁeld half of the time. Upon completion
of a questionnaire, the enumerator would ﬁrst check the questionnaire for mistakes, then
the supervisor would go through the questionnaire to identify inconsistencies, wrong skip
patterns or the like. In addition, ﬁve percent of the questionnaires were also checked by
the ﬁeld manager or an assistant supervisor at the RECODA oﬃce. Furthermore, two
percent of the questionnaires were subject to back-checks, where the ﬁeld manager or
supervisor returned to an interviewed household and repeated parts of the interview to
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ensure that the enumerator had not invented the answers in the questionnaire.
Data entry
Once the ﬁnal questionnaires were ready, they were coded into CSPro (Census and Survey
Processing System) which is a software package for entering survey data developed and
designed by the United States Census Bureau. Cathrine Søgaard Hansen, a research
assistant at the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, programmed this CSPro template
under my supervision. She also led the data entry process in Tanzania and assisted the
RECODA data entry supervisor. Ten local data entry clerks were hired to enter the
information from the questionnaires into the CSPro template. All questionnaires were
entered twice by two diﬀerent data entry clerks and in case of disagreement between the
two entries both clerks would make corrections to their entry and the entries would be
compared again. An entry was accepted when there was no longer a disagreement between
the two entries. For practical purposes the data entry clerks were teamed up in pairs with
that unfortunate implication that one pair colluded and did not enter all the data from
the questionnaires. However, this was found out and corrected.
B Appendix - Choice-based sampling in a logit model
This appendix shows that the logit model provides consistent estimates of the parameters
in the case of choice-based sampling.46
Assume that the probability of adoption in the population, P˜ (ai = 1),
47 is logisti-
cally distributed and depends on a range of farmer and household characteristics, Zi and
subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects, αs:
P˜ (ai = 1|Zi, αs) = Λ(θZi + αs) = exp(θZi + αs)
1 + exp(θZi + αs)
(B.1)
For simplicity assume that all the covariates are discrete, such that we can consider
46I would like to thank Professor Bo Honoré, Princeton University, for indispensable help with the
following derivation.
47I disregard the subscript t on adoption in this exposition.
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probabilities instead of distributions. The result generalizes to continuous covariates.
The probability of adoption in the sample, P (ai = 1), conditional on covariates and
subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects can be rewritten using Bayes rule:
P (ai = 1|Zi, αs) = P (ai = 1, Zi, αs)
P (Zi, αs)
We now use that the sample of adopting farmers is a random sample such that the
probability of the covariates given that the farmer is adopting is the same in the sample
and in the population, P (Zi, αs|ai = 1) = P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 1), and correspondingly for non-
adopting farmers. In addition, we use the law of iterated expectations in the denominator:
P (ai = 1|Zi, αs) = P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 1) · P (ai = 1)∑
P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 0) · P (ai = 0) +
∑
P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 1) · P (ai = 1)
(B.2)
Applying Bayes rule and using equation B.1, we can rewrite:
P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 1) = P˜ (Zi, αs, ai = 1)
P˜ (ai = 1)
=
P˜ (Zi, αs) · Λ(θZi + αs)
P˜ (ai = 1)
(B.3)
Correspondingly,
P˜ (Zi, αs|ai = 0) = P˜ (Zi, αs) · (1− Λ(θZi + αs))
P˜ (ai = 0)
(B.4)
We now insert equation B.3 and B.4 in equation B.2:
P (ai = 1|Zi, αs) =
P (ai=1)
P˜ (ai=1)
· P˜ (Zi, αs) · Λ(θZi + αs)
P (ai=0)
P˜ (ai=0)
P˜ (Zi, αs) · (1− Λ(θZi + αs)) + P (ai=1)P˜ (ai=1) · P˜ (Zi, αs) · Λ(θZi + αs)
We divide numerator and denominator with P˜ (Zi, αs) and insert the deﬁnition of the
logistic distribution:
P (ai = 1|Zi, αs) =
P (ai=1)
P˜ (ai=1)
· exp(θZi+αs)
1+exp(θZi+αs)
P (ai=0)
P˜ (ai=0)
· 1
1+exp(θZi+αs)
+ P (ai=1)
P˜ (ai=1)
· exp(θZi+αs)
1+exp(θZi+αs)
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Finally, we divide both numerator and denominator with the ﬁrst term of the denom-
inator and rearrange:
P (ai = 1|Zi, αs) = exp(θZi + αs + ln(c))
1 + exp(θZi + αs + ln(c))
, c ≡
P (ai=1)/P˜ (ai=1)
P (ai=0)/P˜ (ai=0)
(B.5)
Comparing the probability of adoption in the sample (equation B.5) with the prob-
ability of adoption in the population (equation B.1), it is evident that the choice-based
sampling only aﬀects the estimation of the subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects (or the constant in the
case of no ﬁxed eﬀects) and hence, the estimated parameters of the covariates (θ) are
unaﬀected by the sampling method.
C Appendix - Further robustness of results
Table C.1: Adoption of improved banana cultivation, robustness of results
(1) (2)
Without network size Asked for seedling
RIPAT banana growers in network 0.857∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.190)
Non-RIPAT banana growers in network 0.0533 0.330∗∗∗
(0.0899) (0.112)
Network size -0.264∗∗∗
(0.0683)
Observations 514 472
Note: Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates accounting for subvillage ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard
errors in parentheses. Farmer and household characteristics are included in all speciﬁcations.
* denotes signiﬁcance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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